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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the reasons behind the consensus on the prohibition of interfaith
marriage (IFM) between Muslim women and Scriptural men in Islam (Scriptuaries or Ahl
al-kitāb are people belonging to a religion in which a scripture was revealed as the Torah
or Bible). The thesis argues that the consensus behind that prohibition is fundamentally
determined by (1) the gendered understanding of the construction of qiwwāmah and (2)
the perception of the religious other in Islamic tradition. I argue that these
conceptualizations of woman and the religious other in Islamic tradition result in a
hierarchical marital relationship that intersects in interfaith marriage regulations between
husband and wife and Muslim and Scriptural. First, I construct this argument by
examining the three verses governing interfaith marriage regulations in the Qur’an. The
three verses are variably read by Islamic legal scholars given that there is no definite
textual evidence on whether an interfaith marriage between a Muslim woman and a
Scriptural man is prohibited. Islamic legal scholars also resort to other forms of
clarification to verify their position. Consequently, I examine how the consensus
regarding the prohibition was built by providing a conceptual analysis of its two
determinant factors.
In marriage, the legal postulate of qiwwāmah is understood to sanction the husband’s
authority over his wife. Marriage is also articulated as constituting an element of
enslavement (riqq) for the wife in Islamic legal discourse. I argue that nature and scope of
Qiwwāmah in marriage changes and shifts in meaning in tafsīr literature. With this also
comes the tradition’s position marking the permanent socio-religious superiority of the
Muslim community over all others. This position I argue overlooks the Qur’an’s varying
and distinctive usage of concepts such as: believer (mu’min), Muslim, polytheist
(mushrik), unbeliever (kāfir), and the identification of People of the Book (Ahl al-Kitāb).
This thesis examines the discourse on these concepts in authoritative Qur’anic
commentaries and Islamic legal discourse. Finally, I present early reformists, neotraditionalists, and feminists’ perceptions and reading of these concepts, arguing that
these readings can lead to an inquiry on how IFM regulations can be re-articulated in
Islamic legal discourse.
v
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I. Introduction:
A. Qur’anic textual sources governing Interfaith Marriage (IFM) Regulations: Not
enough?

This thesis puts under scrutiny the broad modern Islamic legal rule that a Muslim woman
is formally forbidden to marry a non-Muslim man regardless of his religion, while a
Muslim man is allowed to get married to a non-Muslim woman, provided she is a
Christian or a Jew.1 This is done through examining the conceptualization of gender
relationships in marriage and the religious other in classical Islamic legal discourse and
Qur’anic commentaries. As it developed, Islamic law established divergent legal rules for
Muslims’ interfaith marriages with numerous categories of unbelievers. Although the
Arabic sources of Islamic legal discourse and authoritative Qur’anic commentaries
extensively deal with the subject, systematic studies of the factors on which interfaith
marriage regulations in Islamic tradition are constructed remain insufficient. The issue of
interfaith marriages for Muslims is addressed in three verses of the Qur’an: Q. 2:221, Q.
60:10, and Q. 5:5.

Q. 2:221 seems to have revealed in the early Medinese period.2 Q. 2:221 prohibits
marriage of Muslim men and women alike to mushrikīn (mushrikāt for women), a term

1

For a critique of the abstraction of the modern rule and the limits it creates for the possibility of legal
change see Gianluca P. Parolin, Interfaith Marriages and Muslim Communities in Scotland: A Hybrid Legal
Solution?, 3 E.J. ISLAMIC MIDDLE EASTERN LAW 84-94 (2015).
2
Q. 2:221 date is not exactly known. In his formative-period tafsīr of Q. 2:221, Muqātil ibn Sulaymān cites
in detail the occasion of the revelation of the verse (sabab al-nuzūl):
Marthad bin Abi Marthad Al-Ghanawī --a man who used to take the prisoners from Mecca to Medinah—He
arranged with a man to bring him to Medinah. There was a woman from Quraysh in Mecca named ‘Anāq,
and she was his friend. She came out then and met him, and said: 'Who is this? Marthad? Welcome, O
Marthad, come tonight and stay at our place.” He said: 'O ‘Anāq, the Messenger of Allah has forbidden
adultery.” She said: 'O people of the tents, this porcupine is the one who is taking your prisoners from
Mecca to Medinah!' Marthad then hid between the trees. The unbelievers of Mecca came after him but
Allah caused them not to see him. He then went to the prisoner and took him out of Mecca and undid his
fetters. He then went to the Prophet and said: 'O Messenger of Allah, shall I marry ‘Anāq?' He remained
silent and did not answer him, then the following was revealed: Do not marry unbelieving women
(idolaters), until they believe: a slave woman who believes is better than an unbelieving woman, even
though she allure you.” MUQĀTIL IBN SULAYMĀN, 1 TAFSĪR MUQĀTIL IBN SULAYMĀN190 (Dar ’Ihyā’ al
turāth 2002).

1

that literally refers to polytheists or idol worshippers who associate others in belief with
God:
Do not marry unbelieving women (idolaters) [mushrikāt], until they believe: a slave
woman who believes is better than an unbelieving woman, even though she allure you.
Nor marry (your girls) to unbelievers [mushrikīn] until they believe: a man slave who
believes is better than an unbeliever, even though he allure you. Unbelievers do (but)
beckon you to the Fire. But Allah beckons by His Grace to the Garden (of Bliss) and
forgiveness, and makes His Signs clear to mankind: that they may celebrate His praise.3

Nevertheless, the term’s exact definition and the types of unbelieving men and women it
encompasses in the prohibition has been a controversial matter in both Qur’anic
commentaries (tafsīr) and Islamic juristic discourse (fiqh).

The prohibition of interfaith marriages between Muslims and unbelievers is also stated in
Q. 60:10. This verse however, uses the term kawāfir rather than mushrikāt:
O you who believe! When there come to you believing women refugees, examine (and
test) them: Allah knows best as to their Faith: if you ascertain that they are Believers,
then do not send them back to the Unbelievers. They are not lawful (wives) for the
Unbelievers, nor are the (Unbelievers) lawful (husbands), for them. But pay the
Unbelievers what they have spent (on their dower). And there will be no blame on you
if you marry them on payment of their dower to them. But do not hold to the
guardianship of unbelieving women: ask for what you have spent on their dowers, and
let the (Unbelievers) ask for what they have spent (on the dowers of women who come
over to you). Such is the command of Allah: He judges (with justice) between you. And
Allah is full of Knowledge and Wisdom.4

In his hadith collection, al-Bukhārī recites the occasion of revelation of the verse which
was revealed after the Hudaybiyyah treaty in 628 A.D.5 The treaty was agreed upon since
the Prophet wanted to perform pilgrimage (‘Umrah) in Mecca, but the powerful merchant
tribe of Quraysh declined his entry.6 The treaty allowed Muhammad entry into Mecca on
the condition that there would be a ten-year period of truce between both parties.7 When
Suhail bin ‘Amr agreed to the treaty, one of the things he stipulated then, was that the
Prophet should return to the pagans anyone coming to him from their side, even if he was
Quran 2:221, translated in ‘Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Qurʼan: translation (Tahrike Tarsile Qur'an Inc.
2003), available at
http://search.credoreference.com.library.aucegypt.edu:2048/content/entry/quran/surah_2_the_heifer/0.
4
Quran 60:10, translated in id. available at
http://search.credoreference.com.library.aucegypt.edu:2048/content/entry/quran/surah_60_the_woman_to_
be_examined/0.
5
MUḤAMMAD IBN ISMĀʻĪL BUKHĀRĪ, SẠHỊ̄H A
̣ L-BUKHĀRĪ Volume 3, Book 50, No. 874 (Peace Vision 1971).
6
MUHẠMMAD IBN JARĪR AL-TẠBARĪ, 23TAFSĪR AL-TẠBARĪ: JĀMIʻ AL-BAYĀN ʻAN TAʼWĪL AL-QURʼĀN 328
(Mu’asast al-Risālah 1999).
7
Id.
3

2

a Muslim.8 The Prophet agreed to that condition and returned Abū Jandal to his father
Suhail bin 'Amr. Thenceforward the Prophet returned everyone in that period (of truce)
even if he was a Muslim.9 On the other hand, those who left from Medinah to Mecca
were not obliged to be returned. According to a Prophetic tradition cited in Tabarī’s tafsīr,
those who left Medinah have chosen disbelief over belief and consequently were of no
use to Muslims.10 The revealed text however made an exception regarding women.
During that period some believing women emigrants came to Allah's Apostle, amongst
these, was Um Kulthūm bint ‘Uqba ’ibn Abū Mu‘ayt who was a young lady then. Her
relative came to the Prophet and asked him to return her, but the Prophet did not return
her to them for Allah had revealed Q. 60:10 regarding women.11 If women came to join
Muslims, then they should be tested for their faith. If it was seen that they truly wanted to
embrace Islam and join Muslims, then they would not return and would not become
lawful to the kufār (though the Qur’an does not use the equivalent of terms such as nonMuslim or unbeliever, yet these are the most common English renderings of the term
kufār (sing. Kāfir) both in translation and usage).12

Finally, the third verse on IFM, Q. 5:5, made it permissible for Muslim men to marry
from the virtuous and/or free (al Muhsānāt) Scriptural women i.e. Christians and Jews
(Ahl al-kitāb):13
This day (all) good and pure things are made lawful to you. The food of the People of
the Book is lawful to you and yours is lawful to them. (Lawful to you in marriage) are
(not only) chaste women who are believers, but chaste women among the People of the
Book, revealed before your time, - when you give them their due dowers, and desire
chastity, not lewdness, nor secret intrigues. If anyone rejects faith, fruitless is his work,
and in the Hereafter he will be in the ranks of those who have lost (all spiritual good).14

8

BUKHĀRĪ, supra note 5.
Id.
10
AL-TẠBARĪ, supra note 6.
11
BUKHĀRĪ, supra note 5.
12
AL-TẠBARĪ, supra note 6, at 329-30.
13
For more on Ahl al-kitāb see Ahmad Pakatchi & Jawad Qasemi. Ahl al-kitāb, Encyclopaedia Islamica.
Brill Online (2008), available at http://www.brillonline.nl.library.aucegypt.edu:2048/entries/encyclopaediaislamica/ahl-al-kitab-COM_0200.
14
Quran 5:5, translated in ‘Abdullah Yusuf Ali, supra note 2, available at
http://search.credoreference.com.library.aucegypt.edu:2048/content/entry/quran/surah_5_the_table_spread/
0.
9
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Al-Tabarī mentions that some interpreters read the verse 5:5 as abrogating the already
established prohibition of interfaith marriages of Muslim men to Scriptural women
(Kitābiyyāt) by Q. 2:221 which states “Do not marry unbelieving women.”15 Other
interpreters who similarly believed that Q. 2:221 encompassed both Polytheists and
Scriptuaries, suggested instead that it was Q. 2:221 that abrogated by Q. 5:5 disregarding
the traditional chronology of the Qur’an. Abrogation (Naskh) was arbitrarily used by the
fuqahā’ and mufassirūn to reason and produce different outcomes on whether IFM
marriages are permissible or not for Muslims.16 Al-Tabarī mentions and supports a third
position, based on interpreting the word ‘unbelieving women’ in Q. 2:221 as
encompassing only the unbelieving idol worshippers of Arabia.17 To the proponents of
this third position, even though verse 2:221 connotes a general statement regarding all
unbelievers, its interpretation only encompasses a specific category of unbelievers (hiya
’āyah ‘āmmun zāhiruhā wa khāssun taʼwīluha) .18 In other words, it excludes Ahl alkitāb. The Qur’anic text, thus, does not expressly forbid or permit an interfaith marriage
between Muslim women and Scriptural (Kitābī) men.

However, proponents of this third view still held that interfaith marriage between Muslim
women and Kitābī men is prohibited. This was based upon a combination of factors: 1)
An analogy of the marriage between Ahl al-kitāb and Muslims with the prohibited
marriage between idol worshippers (mushrikīn) and Muslims in the verse 2:221 based on
the common ratio legis revealed in 2:221: “Unbelievers do (but) beckon you to the Fire,”
2) narratives from the Prophetic tradition to support the prohibition of such marriages,
and 3) the consensus of all the jurists (fuqahā’) on its prohibition.

MUHẠMMAD IBN JARĪR AL-TẠBARĪ, 4 TAFSĪR AL-TẠBARĪ: JĀMIʻ AL-BAYĀN ʻAN TAʼWĪL AL-QURʼĀN365
(Mu’asast al-Risālah 1999).
16
MUHẠMMAD IBN AL-HẠSAN AL-TỤ̄SĪ, 3 AL-ISTIBSẠ̄R FI-MĀIKHTALAFA MINA AL-AKHBĀR 178-9 (Dār alKutub al-Islāmīyah 1956). The Shi‘ite scholar Al-Tụ̄sī also cites another tradition which states that Q. 5:5
has been abrogated by Q. 60:10. Al-Rawānīdī, a Mu‘tazilite scholar and critic of religion who later adhered
to Shiism, adds that Q. 5:5 was rather sanctioning marriage to chaste women among Ahl al-kitāb who have
converted to Islam. He cites a tradition in support of the view that Q. 5:5 was abrogated by Q. 2:221 and Q.
60:10. On the other hand, the Hanbali jurist Al-Jawzī cites a view according to which Q. 60:10 was
abrogated by Q. 5:5 ‘AlĪ BIN MUHAMMAD AL-JAWZĪ, 2 NĀSIKH AL-QUR’AN WA –MANSŪKHU 606 (‘Imadat
al-Bahth al-‘Ilmlī bi Al-Jami‘ah al ’islamiyyah2003). Cf. MUḤAMMAD IBN ʻABDALLĀH IBN AL-ʻARABĪ, ALNĀSIKH WA-AL-MANSŪKH FĪ AL-QURʼĀN AL-KARĪM214 (Maktabat al-Thaqāfah al-Dīnīyah 1992).
17
AL-TẠBARĪ, supra note 6.
18
Id. at 366.
15

4

In the first case, some jurists and authors of Qur’anic commentaries see an analogy
between idol worshippers and Ahl al-kitāb stating that both “beckon you [Muslims] to the
Fire;” they read the textual-based evidence of the permissibility of an interfaith marriage
between a Muslim man and a Kitābiyyah in verse 5:5 as echoing male authority in
marriage. Its specificity and its initial stipulation that “This day (all) good and pure things
are made lawful to you” led to the jurists’ logical deduction that what was not mentioned
in the verse 5:5 was thus unlawful. This deduction helped crystallize the jurists’
understanding of the institution of marriage and spousal rights and obligations. To the
majority of jurists in classical Islamic legal discourse, Muslim woman’s supremacy by
virtue of being Muslim would come in direct contradiction with her acquiescent status as
a wife in the family model construed by jurists from Islamic law sources.19 As for the
jurists’ consensus (’ijmā’) on the impermissibility of an interfaith marriage between a
Muslim woman and a Kitābī man , it constitutes a legitimate source of law that is
irrevocable according to the principles of Islamic law laid down by classical Muslim
jurists; ’ijmā‘ nonetheless acquires this status from textual evidence according to classical
Muslim jurists.20 In this thesis, I argue that the jurists’ consensus on prohibiting interfaith
marriage between Muslim women and Kitābī men stems from a reading of the above
three verses in light of two conceptualizations. These conceptualizations are: a)
qiwwāmah as the mufassirūn derived and understood it from Q. 4:34 and b) the nonbeliever. In the first case, verse 4:34 constitutes the textual basis on which the entire
Islamic model of the family has been shaped. The doctrine of qiwwāmah as derived from
the verse Q. 4:34 sanctions the husband’s authority and regulation of his wife’s mobility,
sexuality, and behavior. This authority, according to major works in the tafsīr literature,
stems from divine preferential designations to males (thus, the religious duty of the wife
See, e.g., ABŪ BAKR IBN MASʻŪD KĀSĀNĪ, BADAʼIʻ AL-ṢANAʼIʻ FI TARTIB AL-SHARAʼIʻ (Dar al-Kutub al
‘ilmiyya 1986).See also ABĪ MANSỤ̄R MUHẠMMAD IBN MUHẠMMAD AL-MĀTURĪDĪ, TAʼWĪLĀT AHL ALSUNNAH (Dar al-kutub al ‘ilmiyya 2005).
20
’ijmā’ is a derivative source of Islamic law and can be defined as “agreement of the community as
represented by its mujtahidūn living in a particular age or generation, an agreement that bestows on those
rulings or opinions [based on probable textual knowledge] subject to it conclusive, certain knowledge. ”
Consensus thus rendered probable textual evidence certain regardless of its nature, how it occurs though is
still a question. Yet in practice, it is identified by looking at past works of mujtahidūn and observing that
they all agreed on the same solution to a particular matter. WAEL HALLAQ, SHARI’A: THEORY, PRACTICE,
AND TRANSFORMATIONS 98-100, 116-9 (Cambridge University Press 2009).
19

5

to obey her husband), and results in enslavement (riqq) as constituting an element of
marriage (al-nikāh) in this hierarchical relationship.
In the second case, given the situation in 7th century Arabia and the Qur’an’s aim to
affirm monotheism (tawhīd) as a legacy of pre-Muhammadan revelation, the Qur’an
makes a clear distinction between Ahl al-kitāb and mushrikīn. Nevertheless, textual
evidence shows that the Qur’an simultaneously accuses Ahl al-kitāb of shirk. Then, I
argue that the consensus on the prohibition of interfaith unions between Muslim women
and Scriptural (Kitābī) men cannot be understood without examining the role and position
of a woman in “Islamic” marital relations and the non-believer/religious other. The
consensus is by and large constructed by making an analogy of an interfaith marriage
between a Muslim woman and a Kitābī man to a Kitābī master owning a Muslim slave. I
argue that the differences and variations in meaning and scope of marital rights and
responsibilities in an Islamic marriage and the conceptualization of a non-believer can
channel Islamic legal discourse in more than one direction with regards to interfaith
marriages between Muslim women and Kitābī men. That is to say that the permissibility
or prohibition of interfaith marriage is to a certain extent dependent upon the
generational, geographical and political consensus on the division of marital rights and
responsibilities. If views and perceptions of male dominance are not prevalent in oral and
practiced culture in society then the prohibition of interfaith marriage in such a case is
questionable.

In their endeavor to construct a normative concept of an ideal Muslim woman, classical
Muslim jurists and interpreters based their perception of female and male sexuality on the
indispensable difference between the two. They perceive males “as having an insatiable
sexual desire aroused by sight, smell, or voice of a woman, thereby distracting and
diverting their energy from productive endeavors to wasteful sexual activity.”21 Females
on the other hand were relegated to the “irreligious realm of sexual passion,” in contrast
to the “illuminated sphere of male (religious) knowledge, which is the sole source of

21

LAMIA RUSTUM SHEHADEH, THE IDEA OF WOMEN IN FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAM 218 (University Press of
Florida 2003).

6

religious authority.”22 Fatema Mernissi also argues that Muslim sexuality is territorial:
“strict space boundaries divide Muslim society into two sub-universes: the universe of
men (the ’ummah (nation), the world, religion and power) and the universe of women, the
domestic world of sexuality and the family.”23 Women are seen as lacking intelligence
but gifted with an ability to defeat men by cunningness and attraction that can undermine
a man’s will and reduce him to a passive role.24 From here, it becomes necessary to
regulate the active and aggressive female sexual instinct with precautionary safeguards to
preserve social order and not cause fitnah.25 Linked to this is the attribution of a certain
role and status to the wife and husband in Muslim traditional thought, the strict genderdifferentiated marital rights and obligations. This contributes thus to the creation of an
authoritarian marital relationship primarily founded on male epistemic privilege through
the doctrine of qiwwāmah. The understanding of marriage in classical Islamic
jurisprudence is also largely affected by the institutions of patriarchy, social stratification,
and slavery.26 Neo-traditionalist movements whose prominent ideologues are Abū al‘Alā’ al-Mawdudī, Hasan Al-Bannā, Sayyid Qutb, Zaynab al-Ghazalī, and Rāshid alGannūchī also operate within the classical understanding of male and female sexuality
despite their individual peculiarities

For the purposes of this thesis, I am concerned primarily with the normative text of
Qur’anic commentaries and Muslim jurists’ legal discourse on qiwwāmah and the nonbeliever. I argue that interfaith marriage regulations in classical Islamic tradition have
been construed in light of the scholars’ understanding of and approach towards two
concepts: qiwwāmah and mushrik, kāfir, Ahl al-kitāb. I aim to argue that the jurists’
perception of martial life as a form of enslavement (riqq) continues to exist today as a

22

ADIS DUDERIJA, CONSTRUCTING A RELIGIOUSLY IDEAL BELIEVER AND WOMAN IN ISLAM 101 (Palgrave
Macmillan 2011).
23
FATEMA MERNISSI, BEYOND THE VEIL: MALE-FEMALE DYNAMICS IN MUSLIM SOCIETY 191-8 (Saqi 2011).
24
Ebrahim Moosa, Transitions in the ‘Progress’ of Civilization in VOICES OF ISLAM (Omid Safi ed.,
Oneworld 2003).
25
MERNISSI, supra note 23, at 50.
26
See KECIA ALI, MARRIAGE AND SLAVERY IN EARLY ISLAM 65-97 (Harvard University Press 2010). LEILA
AHMED, WOMEN AND GENDER IN ISLAM 79-102 (American University in Cairo Press 1993). See also Adis
Duderija, A Case Study of Patriarchy and Slavery: The Hermeneutical Importance of Qurʾānic Assumptions
in the Development of a Values-Based and Purposive Oriented Qurʾān-sunna Hermeneutic, 11 HAWWA 5887 (2013).
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result of the concept of male authority (qiwwāmah); this perception of marriage (nikāh)
constitutes the basic premise upon which the rule on interfaith marriages has been
articulated in Islamic legal discourse. This does not mean that in Islamic legal discourse a
wife is a slave, but rather that slavery allows for understanding one of the central notions
that has shaped the jurists’ views of marriage which is that licit sexual relations are
hierarchical. It was only the male husband/owner who had sexual dominion over the
female wife/slave. Although the jurists’ doctrine of marriage as analogous to slavery
does not bluntly govern Muslims today, it continues to be visible and influential. I aim in
this thesis to unpack interpretations of the Qur’anic text and Islamic tradition that
construct the prohibition of interfaith marriages between Muslim women and Kitābī men.
These interpretations constitute an important part of Islamic law in the legal systems of
many Muslim nation-states today that also have constitutions guaranteeing formal
equality and liberty as their sources of law.

B. Methodology:
I intend to examine the diversity in normative text of the juristic tradition and Qur’anic
commentaries on the doctrine of qiwwāmah. Following this, I will demonstrate how this
understanding of the institution of marriage is clearly reflected in the arguments building
the consensus against an interfaith marriage between a Muslim woman and a Kitābī man.
This understanding of such interfaith marriages continues to have an impact.
The first chapter of this thesis is divided in two sections: tafsīr and Islamic jurisprudence.
In the first section I examine the history of the tafsīr tradition. The aim of this is to
contextualize the shifts in meaning that occur in interpreting the doctrine of qiwwāmah in
tafsīr literature discussed in the following part of this section.

The second section of this chapter looks at the evolution of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) in
order to gain a better understanding of how classical Muslim jurists read, interpreted, and
deduced legal rules from the textual sources. Then, I examine how marriage was
perceived as enslavement (riqq) in fiqh discourse. This is followed by an examination of
8

riqq regulation in fiqh discourse and the impact of its conceptualization and practice on
the status of the wife in the institution of marriage. The next two part of this section then
look at: 1) how marriage as enslavement is manifested in IFM regulations in fiqh
discourse and 2) the variable conceptualizations of the religious other (in this case the
Kitābī) constructed to instill the prohibition. For this chapter, I am using primary source
material: classical Qur’anic commentaries (tafsīr), traditional biographical accounts of the
Prophet Muhammad (sīrah), and formative and post-formative period jurists’ legal texts
(fiqh).These sources are also modes of argument characteristic to legal texts leading
jurists to different conclusions than those in other works.27 Some of these approached
questions of marriage and gender quite differently, even though both were “steeped in the
same scriptural and cultural milieu.”28

The second chapter of this thesis examines interpretations and arguments put forth on the
doctrine of qiwwāmah and the prohibition of interfaith marriage between Muslim women
and Kitābī men by significant figures from the early reformist period and the neotraditionalist movement. In particular, I look at Muhammad ‘Abduh’s tafsīr. ‘Abduh is
one of the pioneer ideologues of the early reformist period though by no means a
representative of all the individual approaches and peculiarities of the entire era. From the
neo-traditionalist period, I look in detail at Sayyid Qutb’s tafsīr. In this chapter, I also
focus on contemporary works of progressive Muslim scholars who include but are not
limited to: ’Amīnah Wadud, ‘Azīzah Al-Hibrī, Sa‘diyya Shaikh, Nasr Hāmid Abū Zayd,
and ’Asmā’ Barlas. I survey progressive Muslim thinkers’ interpretive strategies and
interpretations of Qur’anic text and analysis of concepts that appear in the Qur’an such as
qawwāmūn, shirk, kufr, and Ahl al-kitāb. Though these scholars undertook Qur’anic
interpretation, their works unlike the former reformists, did not include a systematic
survey of all the Qur’anic verses.

My methodology also attempts to raise analytical and theoretical considerations of the
terms “Believer” and “Muslim woman.” As Miriam Cooke argues “the neologism
See the material on marriage in the two ’adab texts in Nadia Maria El Cheikh, In Search for the Ideal
Spouse, 45 J. ECON. SOC. HIST. ORIENT 179-196 (2002).
28
ALI, supra note 26, at 25.
27
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Muslimwoman draws attention to the emergence of a new singular religious identity and
gendered identification that overlays national, ethnic, cultural, historical, and even
philosophical diversity.”29 These feminist scholars have embarked upon the task of
subverting this “Muslimwoman” singular identity by developing alternative
interpretations rooted in egalitarian terms. Their work also serves to highlight the
patriarchal nature of much of the Islamic tradition, particularly when it comes to
authoritative Qur’anic commentaries (tafsīr) and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). This thesis
thus aims to examine the normative concept of Muslimwoman in reference to the textual
indicants (dalīl) found in the authoritative Qur’anic commentaries and classical Sunni
jurisprudence. The purpose of this study is to highlight what Khaled Abou El-Fadl terms
as the “inherent ambiguity” present in textual sources; this results from adopting a
balanced approach towards the Qur’an where neither the author’s intent, language, or the
reader have the upper hand in determining its meaning. This approach is also present in
Farid Esack’s work where he aims to re-examine how the concepts of believer (self) and
non-believer (other) are demarcated in the Qur’an to allow for more space for the
righteous and just other.30 He utilizes this approach to examine how the Qur’anic terms
Islam, kufr, Ahl al-kitāb, mushrikīn, and wilāyah can be re-defined. His work also looks at
modern and pre-modern Muslim theologian views on these terms arguing that “Islamic
conservatism has persistently narrowed the theological base for defining ’imān, ’islām
and widened the base for kufr.”31 The purpose thus of examining both the concepts of
“Muslimwoman” and believer is to show how the meaning of the textual indicants was
produced concerning interfaith marriage between Muslims and Ahl al-kitāb and their
governing in Qur’anic commentaries and Islamic legal discourse. In surveying the various
readings and scope of the concept of qiwwāmah and that of the unbeliever, this thesis
aims to show the dynamism in approaching and deriving meaning in interpretation of
textual sources. This dynamism in producing meaning of both concepts from textual
sources is reflected in the issue of interfaith marriage of a Muslim with an unbeliever
Kitābī (other).

29

Miriam Cooke, Deploying the Muslim Woman, 24 JOURNAL OF FEMINIST STUDIES IN RELIGION 91 (2008).
FARID ESACK, QURÁN, LIBERATION & PLURALISM: AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE OF INTERRELIGIOUS
SOLIDARITY AGAINST OPPRESSION 14 (Oneworld 1997).
31
Id. at 13.
30
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II. Qiwwāmah, Shirk, Kufr, and Ahl al-kitāb in IFM Regulations: A Classical
Approach:
It can be argued that the classical Muslim jurists’ consensus on prohibiting interfaith
marriages between a Muslim woman and a Kitābī man is to a large extent a result of a
patriarchal understanding of marriage. Since the jurists’ perception of male dominance
over a female in the marital relationship entailed that such dominance cannot be allowed
for a Kitābī man over a Muslim woman, consensus was reached on prohibition. To
illustrate how their understanding of marriage shaped the consensus of classical Muslim
fuqahā’ on prohibiting these interfaith marriages, it becomes important to examine the
construction of qiwwāmah and riqq/slavery in classical Muslim legal thought. This is
because the postulate of qiwwāmah has been constructed in the Qur’anic commentaries
(herein after tafsīr) to signify the absolute authority given to the Muslim husband by God
over his wife. For some authors in tafsīr literature, qiwwāmah signified the systematic
reference to female servitude and male power over all women.32

A. Tafsīr:
The first part of this section looks at the history of the Islamic tradition of tafsīr. It
presents the context in which the understanding of the concept of qiwwāmah has
developed and evolved. In this part, I briefly examine the tafsīr tradition which
recognizes certain standards and conventions over the course of Islamic history that mark
the sound interpretation of a Qur’anic verse from the inaccurate one. This investigation is
necessary to better understand the nature and methodological approaches of the
authoritative tafsīr works in the discussion that follows. This brief survey of the tafsīr
tradition also puts into context Muslim feminists and reformists’ readings of the
qiwwāmah verse Q. 4:34 as contributions to tafsīr literature. These readings will be
discussed in the next chapter.

See MUHẠMMAD AL-SHĪRĀZĪ AL-BAYDẠ̄WĪ, ANWĀR AL-TANZĪL WA-ASRĀR AL-TAʼWĪL (Dār ’ihyā’ al
turāth al ‘arābī 1997). MUḤAMMAD IBN AḤMAD QURṬUBĪ, TAFSĪR AL-QURTỤBĪ: AL-JĀMIʻ LI-AHḲĀM ALQUR'ĀN (Dār al-kutub al misriyya 1964). MUHẠMMAD ʻABDUH, TAFSĪR AL-MANĀR (Dār al-Manār 1935).
32
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The second part of this section presents traditional mufassirūn formulations and discourse
relating to qiwwāmah. In the examined formative and post-formative period tafsīr
literature, the mufassirūn (plural for mufassir) interpreted the term “qawwāmūn” as the
natural predisposition of man to hold authority over women. These mufassirūn, the work
of which I discuss in detail in this chapter, perceive the husband to be his wife’s superior,
and the one responsible of morally directing her. In some of the tafsīr literature,
superiority of husband over wife is justified by a series of skills and doctrinal standards
that result in the production of a divine preference of men over women even beyond their
role as husbands. By and large, the verse Q. 4:34 known as the qiwwāmah verse is
interpreted in the tafsīr literature as a command to husbands to exercise authority over
their wives by virtue of what God has preferentially designated them with, both morally
and materially as a men. This understanding of the concept of qiwwāmah has endorsed a
requirement of the wife to obey her husband (tā’ah).

Some of the mufassirūn go further and associate the wife with a slave or prisoner
(‘āniyah); by marriage the woman is under, and subject to, the absolute authority of her
husband.33 In recognition of this masculine authority, the husband is expected to maintain
his wife and family. The gendered legal production of qiwwāmah and tā’ah has led to a
reading of the Qur’anic verses and Prophetic tradition on interfaith marriages between
Muslims and Ahl al-kitāb that make it impossible for a Muslim woman to marry a Kitābī.
By looking at such concepts and their consequences on the marital relationship and
contract, I argue that the contextual understandings of such concepts were at the root of
the consensus reached on the prohibition of interfaith marriage between a Muslim woman
and a Kitābī man. The second part of this section thus traces the “discursive stages”
through which the concept of qiwwāmah was assembled and evolved from Q. 4:34 in

33

This conceptualization of marriage is attributed to the Prophet himself and is based on a number of
Prophetic traditions which include: “Marriage is enslavement; let one, therefore, be careful in whose hands
he places his daughter.” “Show fear of God in your relations with women, for they suffer in your homes.”
AHMAD IBN ʻABD AL-ḤALĪM IBN TAYMĪYAH, 32 MAJMŪ‘ FATĀWA 28 (Mujama‘ al-Malik Fahd 1995)
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tafsīr literature from the pre-modern period and up till the eighteenth century as “an
independent and separate (trans-contextual) patriarchal construct.”34
1. History of the Islamic Tradition of Tafsīr
The works of tafāsīr can be divided into three historical phases. The first phase was that
of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. The Prophet was considered to be the
first commentator on the Qur’an. His commentaries were transmitted to and amplified by
those of his companions among which was the prominent ‘Abdallah Ibn ‘Abbas. The
second phase marks the transmission of these interpretations to the disciples and
followers (al-tabi‘īn). Lastly, the third phase begins with the formal documentation and
development of the science of interpretation (ʻilm al-tafsīr).
The word tafsīr is used only once in the Qur’an whereas taʼwīl is mentioned seventeen
times.35 The word taʼwīl connotes explanation or interpretation. It seems that both words
tafsīr and taʼwīl were used synonymously without differentiation in meaning (ma‘na) in
the early history of tafsīr. They were technical terms within the works of Qur’anic
commentaries, used specifically during the first three Islamic centuries.36 Later however,
both tafsīr and taʼwīl came to be distinguished from each other. The latter was seen as
“the product of research and investigation, the former dependent upon transmission from
Muhammad and his companions… taʼwīl became limited to interpretation which leaves
the obvious (zāhir) sense and delves into more speculative language (bātin).”37

Methods of interpretation have been mainly divided to interpretation according to
recorded traditions (tafsīr bi ’al-ma’thūr) and interpretation in accordance with
Omaima Abou-Bakr, The Interpretive Legacy of Qiwwāmah as an Exegetical Construct in MEN IN
CHARGE: RETHINKING AUTHORITY IN MUSLIM LEGAL TRADITION (Ziba Mir Hosseini et al.eds, Oneworld
Publications 2015).
35
I. Poonawala, Taʾwīl. Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Brill Online (2012), available at
http://www.brillonline.nl.library.aucegypt.edu:2048/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/ta-wi-l-SIM_7457.
36
Id. See for examples al-Tabarī and al-Māturīdī who use the term taʼwīl in the titles of their tafsīr.
MUHAMMAD IBN JARĪR AL-TABARĪ, TAFSIR AL-TABARĪ: JĀMIʻ AL-BAYĀN FĪ TAʼWĪL AL-QUR’AN (Mu’asast
al-Risālah 1999). ABĪ MANSŪR MUHAMMAD IBN MUHAMMAD AL-MĀTURĪDĪ, TA’WĪLĀT AHL AL-SUNNAH
(Dar al-kutub al ‘ilmiyya 2005).
37
Andrew Rippin, Tafsīr. Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Brill Online (2012), available at
http://www.brillonline.nl.library.aucegypt.edu:2048/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/tafsi-r-SIM_7294.
34
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considered opinion (tafsīr bi ’al-raʾy).38 This classical separation has come to divide the
Muslim community on “the authority of community (maʿthūr) versus the authority of
intellect (ra’y).”39 This classification, however, cannot be independently used to assess
Qur’anic commentaries and categorize them into one group or the other for “different
mufassirūn have different concerns and goals, and this is reflected in the relative weight
they put upon elements such as history, grammar, semantics, law, theology, or folklore.”40
Emphasis on grammar was seen in works for example which included Al-Zajjāj’s
(d.311/923) tafsīr Maʿānī ’l-Ḳurʾān wa iʿrābuhu, while work of al-Qurtubī (d.676/1272),
Ahkām al-Qur’an. They worked within a framework of legal analysis and used out of
necessity grammatical and historical elements to make a case for his legal points. Among
the other tools used for interpretation was the narratives offered through Prophetic history
the function of which was to “prove the fact of revelation and to embody an interpretation
that would relate the text to a context.”41 Symbol, allegory, and inspiration developed in
tafsīr within the context of Sufism.42
Four periods distinguished how the literature of tafsīr developed: formative, classical,
mature, and contemporary. The formative period included tafsīr bil riwāyah
(interpretation through oral transmission), before it gained authority with the emergence
of the hadith science. Written works most likely did not appear until the early eighth
century. The commentaries in this early phase until the early ninth century were not yet
characterized by a uniform character. They mainly included paraphrasing of Qur’anic
verses and clarifying narratives about the verses based on isra’iliyat, Jewish and Christian
texts and reports. The formative period texts of tafsīr also included discussions of
legalistic verses.43 The classical period marks the emergence of the epitome of traditional
tafsīr, comprehensive and hadith-based, al-Tabarī’s tafsīr and the significant “yet subtle
38

Additional classifications include: symbolic Sufi interpretation (bil ramz), thematic approach (mawdu‘ī),
literary analysis (bayanī), and scientific interpretation (‘ilmī), see MUHAMMAD HUSAYN AL-DHAHABI, ALTAFSIR WA ’AL MUFASSIRĪN (Dar al kutub al hadithah 1976).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Claude Gilliot, Exegesis of the Qur’an: Classical and Medieval. Encyclopedia of the Quran. Brill Online
(2007), available at http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-the-quran/exegesis-ofthe-quran-classical-and-medieval-EQCOM_00058.
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in its theological variance” Ta’wīlāt ahl al-Sunna by Al-Māturīdī (d.333/944). Other
works of the mature period that marked the development of the tafsīr tradition included
the tafsīr of ‘Umar Zamaksharī (d. 548/1153), Fakhr al Din al Razī (d.606/1209), alQurtubī (d. 671/1273), and Jalal al-din al Suyutī (d. 911/1505). During this phase, the
tafsīr al Qur’an al ‘azīm of Ibn Kathīr (d.774/1373) was influenced by Ibn Taymīyah’s
(d.728/1328) attempt to reconcile the Qur’an and Sunna. Ibn Taymīyah’s suspicion of
utilizing ‘isra’iliyat to interpret the Qur’an as well as all sorts of intellectual speculation
whether it was legal or interpretive (tafsīr bil ra’y).
While examining traditional commentaries on the Qur’an, it is important to keep in mind
that the interpreters, among whom were jurists did not simply lay down a homogeneous
literature of rigid male/female and Muslim/non-Muslim hierarchies. The focus was rather
on marital life as a fluid interaction between a man and a woman, Muslim and nonMuslim, where thoughts, illicit acts, marital purposes, functions, and attitudes were at
issue and not the fixing of boundaries based on gender and religion. The focus was on the
capability of humans to abuse and on ensuring the perseverance of the religion. The focus
was on maintaining a certain madhab and line of legal thought. Legal culture had
knowledge, the right, the ideal, and human nature as its central themes.44
2. The Qiwwāmah Verse Q. 4:34 in Traditional Tafāsīr:
This section of the chapter presents the changes and shifts in meaning that occur in the
nature and scope of the normative concept of qiwwāmah derived from Q. 4:34. This is
done by examining tafsīr works of the Qur’anic verse. This section of the thesis makes
the case that there is variability and arbitrariness in understanding and representing
qiwwāmah. In particular, I am referring to the scope and nature of husband’s authority,
divine preferential designations given to males over females, and a wife’s obedience to
her husband. The discursive stages through which qiwwāmah evolves to become
44

Hallaq made a point on the effects of the processes of systemization reasoning that this process
restructured “the raw legal material Islam encountered. This systemization was given sharp expression in
the profound desire of Muslim scholars for logical coherence while at the same time they took into full
consideration what they deemed to be divinely inspired propositions. See Wael Hallaq, Review: The Use
and Abuse of Evidence: The Question of Provisional and Roman Influences on Early Islamic Law, 110
JOURNAL OF AMERICAN ORIENTAL SOCIETY 90 (1990).
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understood as a natural result of inherent characteristics in males and females also
suggests that the context in which the mufassirūn interpreted the verse also played a role.
This discursiveness in understanding the concept of qiwwāmah prompts one to ask how
can Q. 4:34 be read now; this variance in reading the verse suggests that there can be a
number of other interpretive possibilities that are worth pursuing. In doing so, arguments
behind the prohibition of an interfaith marriage between a Muslim woman and a Kitābī
can be re-articulated.
Men are the protectors and maintainers [qawwāmūn] of women, because Allah has
given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their
means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient, and guard in (the
husband's) absence what Allah would have them guard. As to those women on whose
part you fear disloyalty and ill-conduct [nushūzahunna], admonish them (first), (next),
refuse to share their beds, (and last) beat them (lightly); but if they return to obedience,
do not seek against them means (of annoyance): for Allah is Most High, Great (above
you all).45

The normative concept of qiwwāmah comes from the Qur’anic term “qawwāmūn,” which
is the plural form of “qawwām” from the root q.w.m. and in Arabic can have numerous
meanings which include: carry, get up, take, straighten, provide, rebel, support, and
justice.46 Thus, a plausible interpretation of the term qawwāmūn in Q. 4:34 can be
maintainer or protector.
Following a chorological order in surveying the tafsīr literature on Q 4:34, I begin with
the early tafsīr of Muqātil ibn Sulaymān (d.150/767). He begins his interpretation of Q.
4:34 in his work entitled Tafsīr, using the narrative device which figures as the immediate
cause of revelation (sabab al nuzūl).47 He then writes that (yakūlu: al rijāl musallatūn
‘ala al nisā’) men have authority over women and that they have been favored over

THE QURʼAN: TRANSLATION (Abdullah Yusuf Ali, Tahrike Tarsile Qurʼan 7th U.S. ed. 2001).
Transliteration: “Ar-Rijālu Qawwāmūna `Alá An-Nisā' Bimā Fađđala Allāhu Ba`đahum `Alá Ba`đin Wa
Bimā 'Anfaqū Min 'Amwālihim Fālşşāliĥātu Qānitātun Ĥāfižātun Lilghaybi Bimā Ĥafiža Allāhu Wa Al-Lātī
Takhāfūna Nushūzahunna Fa`izūhunna Wa Ahjurūhunna Fī Al-Mađāji`i Wa Ađribūhunna Fa'in
'Aţa`nakum Falā Tabghū `Alayhinna Sabīlāan 'Inna Allāha Kāna `Alīyāan Kabīrāan.”
46
MUHẠMMAD IBN MANZỤR
̄ , 12 LISĀN AL-ʻARAB 225-9 (Dār Sạ̄dir: Dār Bayrūt 2003).
47
MUQĀTIL IBN SULAYMĀN, 1 TAFSĪR MUQĀTIL IBN SULAYMĀN 370 (Dar ’Ihyā’ al turāth 2002).
45
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women in terms of rights and prerogatives (haqq), as they have authority in disciplining
them. He reads qānitāt as those wives who are obedient to God and their husbands.48
Al-Tabarī (d.310/ 923) was one of the later pre-modern mufassirūn whose standard work
outlined men’s disciplining task (ta’dīb) of women from Q 4:34.49 To him this was a
responsibility given by God to man since men are stronger and because they provide
dowry (mahr) and maintenance (nafaqa). Following his establishment of men’s ethical
authority and superiority, he also made the case that their divine mission to provide
nafaqa is in itself a privilege: “they are responsible for providing because they are
superior, and they are superior because they are responsible for providing.”50
His younger contemporary al-Māturīdī (d.333/944) cites al-Tabarī’s tafsīr of the verse in
Ta’wīlāt Ahl al-Sunna as one of the plausible interpretations of Q. 4:34. Al- Māturīdī’s
work also includes divergent interpretations of the verse. He refers to the opinions of ahl
al ta’wīl and ahl al ‘ilm. The former read the verse as addressing spouses (azwāj) and
emphasize the obligation of the husband to provide nafaqa based on the textual evidence
“bima anfaqu min amwālihim” and ‘ijmā ‘ahl al-‘ilm. Some of ahl al ‘ilm though have
interpreted the verse to indicate that a marriage is not valid without a male guardian since
they are the qawwāmūn over their daughters before they are married.51 To this al-Māturīdī
states that it has been said (waqīl:) that even if the verse was addressing both husbands
and guardians, it would in fact count as evidence that marriage is valid without a guardian
(waliyy); the preference was granted to some over others ; a preference in habitus (khilqa)
as “God made men from the people who earn, trade, and perform all kinds of crafts, and
settle their wives’ matters, yet if some women are capable of settling their own matters
(qiyām bi ’umūrihinna) which include buying and selling then marrying themselves off is
also permissible even if men are qawwāmūn over them.”52 In other words, men have been
given this responsibility because of how society was made. However, “if a time comes
48

Id. at 371.
MUHẠMMAD IBN JARĪR AL-TẠBARĪ, 8 TAFSĪR AL-TẠBARĪ: JĀMIʻ AL-BAYĀN ʻAN TAʼWĪL AL-QURʼĀN 290
(Mu’asast al-Risālah 1999).
50
Id.
51
ABĪ MANSỤR
̄ MUHẠMMAD IBN MUHẠMMAD AL-MĀTURĪDĪ, 3 TAʼWĪLĀT AHL AL-SUNNAH 156 (Dar alkutub al ‘ilmiyya 2005).
52
Id. at 157.
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when men are no longer capable of nafaqa, then a woman’s nafaqa becomes the
responsibility of her guardian (mahārimihinna) as that who is incapable of nafaqa
becomes similar to a woman in khilqa.”53 Hence, a husband and a guardian in this case
are no longer similar in khilqa. Nafaqa in this case is made a duty due to women’s
“weakness and lack of ability to earn, trade, and perform in all kinds of crafts due to her
khilqa.” He cites a tradition from Ibn Abbas commenting on the verse “Men are rulers
over (’umara’ ‘alayhinna) women means that the woman has to obey her man in all of
what Allah has commanded her, this includes the kind treatment of her family, the
protection of his money, and his merits over her in nafaqa and power.”54 He also cites
other opinions which claim that the preference of men over women is in reason,
inheritance, and wealth. Al-Māturīdī then refutes Al Shāfi‘ī’s interpretation which claims
that the verse addresses guardians and implies that nikāh can never be valid without a
waliyy, as this would mean that a waliyy would also be responsible for nafaqa when alShafi‘i madhab does not state that this is a waliyy’s obligation.55
On the issue of a wife’s obedience to her husband, Al-Māturīdī states that qānitāt can
imply in Q. 4:34 either obedience to God or husband, or being in charge of their
husband’s rights (qā’imāt bi hukūk azwājihinna).56 The difference between the last two is
not stated. On nushūz, Al-Māturīdī emphasizes that men are instructed with good
treatment (husn al ‘ishra) and women with obedience (tā’ah). Hence if the latter disobey
their husbands and refuse sexual relations with them, then the husband should “remind
her of what God has made his right,” and abandon her and not have conjugal relations
until it becomes difficult for her.57 Al-Māturīdī elaborates on the term admonishing
defining it as “words that soften hard hearts, and make something desirable for the one
who is disinclined.” As a last resort men are instructed to beat their wives (darb ghayr
mubrih) “in a manner that preserves the harmony (mawwada) and mercy (rahma)

53

Id. at 158.
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Id. at 159.
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Id. at 161.
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between them.”58 He didactically cites the Prophetic tradition "The best of you are those
who are best to their families, and I am the best of you to my family.”59
In Ma‘ānī al Qur’an, Al-Zajjāj (d.311/923), Al-Tabarī’s contemporary, interprets Q. 4:34
as meaning that “men are in charge of women in what they are entitled to from their
husbands [al rajul qayyim ‘ala al mar’ah fīmā yajib lahā ‘alahyhi].” He perceives the
preference (tafdīl) of men over women in terms of their knowledge and the differentiation
between them because of men’s responsibility to provide nafaqa. Rather than using the
term tā’ah, he reads qānitāt as those women who are in charge of what their husbands
have a right to (qānitāt ’ay al qayyimmāt bi hukuk azwājihinna).60 However, he does not
specify what these rights are.
The tafsīr of the Muʿtazilite Islamic scholar ‘Umar Zamaksharī (d.538/1144) marks the
consolidation of a hierarchical reading of qiwwāmah in Q. 4:34 through providing
amassing reasons for it.61 The author takes the construct of qiwwāmah to a new level as
he outlines in a random fashion a series of skills, gender-based inherent characteristics,
and inferences from juristic discourse. The author states that men are superior “in reason,
resoluteness, determination, strength, writing, horsemanship, and spear-throwing.”
Amongst men are ‘the prophets and ‘ulama’… they perform the imāmah, the jihād, the
‘adhān, the khutbah, i‘tikāf, loud takbīrāt, and are witnesses in hudūd and qasās.62
Zamaksharī also expressly makes the metaphor of the husband/wife relationship
comparing it to the relationship between a ruler and his subjects as the latter too manage
their subjects by ordering and forbidding them.63 Al Razī (d.606/1209) adds to this list of
justifications of what now has become a more generic assumption man’s (rather than
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ABĪ ISHẠQ
̄ IBRĀHĪM IBN AL-SARĪAL-ZAJJĀJ, 2 MAʻĀNĪ AL-QURʼĀN WA-IʻRĀBUH 47 (‘ālam al kutub 1998).
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For a similar argument see Abou Bakr, supra note 34.
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husband’s) superiority over woman “wilāyah in marriage, divorce, and number of wives,
and lineage.”64
Al-Baidāwī also mentions the ruler/subject metaphor made in Zamaksharī’s tafsīr. His
contribution in interpreting Q. 4:34 though is his distinction between divine preference
(wahbī) and acquired preference (kasbī) for men over women.65 He states that God has
favored men “with completeness in ‘aql, management, strength in carrying out tasks and
divine commands.”66 Based on the above he deduces that “this is why they [men] have
been singled for prophet hood, imāmah, wilāya, obligation of jum‘ah prayers and jihad,
nerviness, greater share in inheritance, and domineeringly take the decision of separation
(al istibdād bi al furāq).”67
In In his tafsīr, the Mālikī al-Qurtubī (d.671/1273) “signaled the beginning of a new
trajectory that attempts to use either contemporaneous cultural views or the time’s known
scientific ‘facts’ as evidence to corroborate an exegete’s perception of gender
differences.”68 He begins his interpretation of the verse mentioning the occasion of the
verse’s revelation; the verse was revealed when a man slapped his wife and she
complained about him to the Prophet (PBUH). Her family who went with her said: “O
Messenger of Allah! I gave him my daughter in marriage and he slapped her”. The
Prophet kept saying: “Retaliation! Retaliation! And there is no other judgment to be
held”.69 But then verse Q. 4:34 indicating that Men are the protectors and maintainers of
women was revealed. The Prophet (PBUH) said: “We wanted something and Allah
wanted something else”.70 This verse as the fuqahā’ read it was not revealed to support
the act condemned by the Prophet himself, but rather to regulate how a man should
“discipline” his wife; al-Qurtubī notes that if a woman maintains the rights of her
husband, then he should not abuse her, “but if they return to obedience, do not seek
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against them means (of annoyance): for Allah is Most High, Great (above you all).”71
Qiwwāmah entails his duty to manage his wife’s affairs, disciplining her, keeping her in
her home, and preventing her visibility to others, while the wife’s duty is to obey her
husband so long as he does not ask her to commit a sin.72
The ‘illah given for this qiwwāmah is the preference given for some men over some
women. Al- Qurtubī cites some preferential designations such as men’s completeness in
reason (‘aql), and the issue of inheritance in that men receive a greater share than women
and they spend their wealth on dowry (mahr) and in maintenance (nafaqa).73 AlQurtubī’s demonstration of preference is not merely based on material considerations but
also on a certain perception of inherent gender-based traits. His works mark the
commencement of a path turning personal gender perceptions into biological facts. He
writes that:
It is said that men have the privilege of mind and better management… and it has been
said that men have strong natures that women do not have because men’s disposition is
determined by heat and dryness which gives them strength and hardness, whereas
women’s disposition is determined by humidness and coldness, giving them the
characteristics of leniency and weakness.74

He adds that for Mālikīs and Shāfi’īs, if the man is unable to provide nafaqa, he becomes
incapable of being a qawwām in which case the wife may choose to terminate the
marriage since its purpose has been defeated.75 Maintenance to Al-Qurtubī thus defines
and justifies in part a husband’s (‘illa for) superiority over the wife. To Hanafīs on the
other hand, the inability to provide nafaqa does not create ground for terminating the
marriage contract. Q. 2:280 states that “if the debtor is in a difficulty, grant him time till it
is easy for him to repay.”76 Al- Qurtubī emphasizes that these are the ‘illah for
qiwwāmah even though he simultaneously asserts that the pronoun “hum” in the Arabic
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word “ba’aduhum” which literally means some of them, refers to both men and women.77
He does not attempt to reconcile the contradiction between both his statements, which
Sheikh Muhammad Abduh, one of the leaders of 19th century reformist movement does in
his tafsīr.
The next section of the verse characterizes righteous women as “qānitāt” which AlQurtubī interprets as a divine command for wives to obey their husbands. The expression
qānitāt” (qānit for men) comes from the root word q.n.t. and is used to describe a reverent
and submissive Muslim, a worshipper or a devout Muslim who prolongs his performance
of prayers, and all those who fulfil God’s commands.78 He immediately backs up his
interpretation with a Prophetic tradition “It was narrated that Abu Hurayrah said: It was
said to the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him): Which of
women is best? He said: “The one who makes (her husband) happy when he looks at her,
obeys him when he tells her to do something, and does not disobey him with regard to
herself or her wealth in a way that he dislikes.” Al- Qurtubī defines nushūz as wife’s
disobedience to the husband, and specifically refers to the woman who makes it strenuous
for her husband to have access to her “istas‘abat ‘ala ba’liha.” When discussing beating,
he mentions that it is restricted only to the matter of the wife’s sexual availability, and its
purpose is only to ensure righteousness rather than to induce harm, likening this practice
to one who is correcting their “ghulām.” He supports this statement with a Prophetic
tradition where the Prophet stated during a sermon in his last pilgrimage to Mecca: “Lay
injunctions on women kindly, for they are prisoners with you having no control of their
own persons.”
In his tafsīr, Ibn Kathīr (d.773/1373) takes the construct of qiwwāmah in Q. 4:34 to a new
level by connecting it to the concept of darajah which appears in the verse Q. 2:228. He
extends the influence of the concept of qiwwāmah from the home to the public sphere as
he cites the Prophetic tradition “No people will prosper that has delegated a woman to
lead their affairs.” Ibn Kathīr also cites one of the preferential designations of men over
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women as being discipline, which is in line with sabab nuzūl al ’ayah.79 Ibn Kathīr who
was influenced by Ibn Taymīyah uses the method of reported traditions and hadith in his
tafsīr extensively. Ibn Kathīr reads qawwāmūn as “human predisposition of man to be
leader of the woman, her superior, who directs her, and has a right to correct her if she
deviates from the straight path.”80
In his biography (sīrah)of the Prophet, Zād Al-M’ād, Ibn al-Qayyim (d.751/1350), a
disciple of Ibn Taymiyyah (d.728/1328), justifies the obligation of a woman to carry out
household chores as necessary to maintain the concept of qiwwāmah for if a man serves
his wife at home, the qiwwāmah would be undermined. He argues that man provides
maintenance )nafaqa) for both sexual availability and domestic service provided by the
wife in accordance with what is customary, and “the customary is the woman serving her
husband and taking care of the home.” He goes on to emphasize that the wife is
restrained/confined in her husband’s home and cites the hadith “Show fear of God in your
relations with women for they suffer [‘awānīn] in your homes,” Ibn al-Qayyim explains
the ‘ānnī [plural ‘awānīn] “is a prisoner, and that the rank of those restrained is to serve
those whom they fall under their hand/authority; for there is no doubt that marriage is
enslavement, as some of the Salaf have said: Marriage is enslavement, let everyone of
you weigh carefully [to whom] he enslaves his daughter.”81
Ibn Al-Qayyim wrote that “the wife is her husband’s prisoner, a prisoner being akin to a
slave. The Prophet directed men to support their wives by feeding them with their own
food and clothing them with their own clothes; he said the same about maintaining a
slave."82 Though this analogy might be deemed harsh and unjust to women, other factors
should be taken into consideration. The Ahl Al-hadith empiricist scheme, of which the
Hanbalī madhab is generally considered the successor, viewed the Qur’an and the
“authentic” hadith as the only valid source of Islamic law and theology. They chose to
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resort to weak (da‘īf) hadiths over principles deduced from the Qur’an or from reasoning
by analogy.83
Al-Suyūtī’s (d.911/1505) qur’anic commentary tafsīr al-jalālayn also emphasized
different aspects of male authority during the Mamluk period where increased women’s
activity in the public sphere resulted in the issuance of edicts that tried to limit the
presence of women in the public sphere. His work emphasized “a wife’s subservience and
obedience to husband’s orders, and the prohibition of going outside of the house without
his approval.”84
The above section presented an analysis of the discourse on the concept of qiwwāmah
derived from Q. 4:34 in the tafsīr tradition. This discourse is marked by transformations
and creations of meaning by the interpreters “according to their own personal views
stemming from their historical, sociocultural contexts.” These works mark the shift in
meaning of qiwwāmah from responsibility that is limited into an authority and privilege
that are not only present on the financial level but in all aspects of the marital
relationship. Furthermore, the construct of qiwwāmah was instrumental in establishing an
Islamic model of the marriage institution, one where gender relations are based on
normative male leadership. This role that qiwwāmah plays in maintaining what is
perceived as an Islamic model of the marriage institution has a long-lasting impact on
how IFM are interpreted from the textual evidence and regulated in Islamic legal
discourse.

The next section of this chapter provides a historical overview of the evolution of Islamic
jurisprudence. Having contextualized how the jurists interpreted and deduced legal rules
from the textual sources, I then turn to look at how marriage is regulated in fiqh discourse.
Marriage in fiqh discourse is perceived in a hierarchical fashion. Marriage is perceived as
a kind of ownership and analogies are made in its regulation to buying a slave. The
section that follows then demonstrates how this is manifested in the arguments supporting
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the prohibition of a marriage between a Muslim woman and a Kitābī man. Finally, I look
at how the conceptualization of the religious other in fiqh discourse and tafsīr tradition
has been detrimental in building the consensus on the prohibition.

B. Islamic Jurisprudence:

The first part of this section provides the historical background and evolution of the two
main approaches to the Islamic tradition namely: the intellectual movement (ahl al ra’ay)
and the traditionalist movement (ahl al-hadith), demonstrating the similarities and
differences between them. An examination of the ideological disagreements and the
developments that took place following the Prophet’s death and the resulting emergence
of the four Sunni schools (al-madhāhib al-’Arba‘a) is necessary to understand how
mainstream Sunni Islamic jurists approached, read, and understood the textual sources
namely: the Qur’an and the Sunna. This examination is also necessary to understand how
mainstream Sunni Islamic fuqahā’ established authority. This authority continues to
exercise power despite the apparent lack of concision and clarity of what the dynamic and
fluid concepts of qiwwāmah, mushrik, kāfir, Kitābī, and Muslim entail when it comes to
interfaith marriages in Islamic legal discourse.
The second part of this section examines the way the concept of qiwwāmah derived from
Q 4:34 has affected the traditionist jurists’ understanding of the marital relationship. This
will be done mainly by looking generally at marriage as understood by classical Islamic
fuqahā'. I specifically show how the hasty prejudicial understanding of qiwwāmah as
absolute male dominance and supremacy in marriage had a major impact on the jurists’
discourse regulating marital relations. It is also reflected in the logic of the Islamic
marriage contract. The section discusses and analyzes how the fuqahā’ conceptualized
marriage (nikāh) and the essential elements of the marriage contract (‘aqd al nikāh), the
linguistic formulas used to describe the offer of nikāh and analogies made by the fuqahā’
to describe the transaction of a marriage, maintaining relations, and termination of the
marriage contract. This section elucidates the logic of the ‘aqd al nikāh in Islamic law
treatises. This logic confirms the perception that the husband has the right to and
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authority over his wife akin to a commodity acquired so long as maintenance (nafaqa)
continues.
The third part of this section then briefly surveys the Qur’anic and Prophetic tradition’s
approaches to slavery (riqq). It examines the etymology of the concept of riqq and how
riqq became an indispensable element in the marital relationship for the fuqahā’ in a
period of political takeover and Islamic conquests where slavery and concubinage
flourished. The third part of this section also contrasts the derogatory effect of the
constructed concept of qiwwāmah regarding women’s status with the revelation and
tradition encouraging people to free slaves, most of which were women, considering this
as an act of piety. I make this contrast to highlight the emancipatory dimension of the
message of the Qur’an that the fuqahā’ depart from when analyzing marital relationship.

The fourth part examines the analogy made between an interfaith marriage between a
Muslim woman and a Kitābī man and a Kitābī master owning a Muslim slave in Islamic
law treatises to justify the prohibition of these interfaith marriages. Finally, in the fifth
part of this section, I closely look at how the concepts of kufr, shirk, and ’imān that
appear in Q. 2:221, Q. 60:10, and Q. 5:5were articulated and used in fiqh and tafsīr
literature. It also demonstrates the disagreement among the jurists on whether to
categorize Ahl al-kitāb as mushrikīn or not and over which groups to be exactly
considered as part of Ahl al-kitāb.

1. The Evolution of Islamic Jurisprudence:

In order to gain a better understanding of the depth of the argument behind the reasoning
to prohibit interfaith marriage, it is important to examine how different madhāhib and
approaches have developed following the death of the prophet as a result the
disagreement between people of considered opinion (ahl al ra’y) and the traditionalist
movement (ahl al-hadith). This section examines how different Muslim groups came to
understand the Qur'an and Sunna under different lights and analyzes the consequences of
such a study on how scholars came to understand concepts such as qiwwāmah and riqq as
26

reasoning to prohibit/ allow certain aspects in the marital relationship (including interfaith
marriage).

Being the main heritage of the Muslim community, the Qur'an and Sunna are viewed
highly by the all Muslims as being the core of Islamic tradition (turāth) and as being a
body of knowledge that provides guidance from the smallest to the largest of decisions
pertaining to both individuals (fard) and the nation (’ummah). In spite of this, the Qur’an
and Sunna remain a contested field where disagreements over interpretations are ongoing.
Thus, the turāth can be perceived in accordance with how the Qur’an and Sunna “have
interacted throughout Islamic history with all sorts of persons, forces, and situations to
create an Islamic canon of doctrine, philosophy, ethics, [jurisprudence], and social and
political attitudes and notions.”85 It is a “‘cumulative tradition,’” a religio-historical
construct; this tradition is “‘diverse, it is fluid, it grows, it changes, it accumulates.’”86
While the Qur'an and Sunna are notably the most important sources of turāth and on
which all juristic rulings are based, other sources of Islamic law include consensus (’ijmā
‘) and analogical reasoning (qiyās). These sources, however, remain later derivations that
are dependent on the aforementioned sources.87 On the other hand, while there is
agreement that the Qur'an and Sunna are the two main sources to which the ’ummah
should go to for guidance, nevertheless, since the very early stage of the Muslim
community, disagreements on how each group chooses to interpret these two sources
have continued.

There are two main reasons for such disagreement at such an early stage. The first
concerns the characteristics and structure of the guidance provided by the Qur'an and
Sunna themselves in relation to the diversity of issues (political, legal, ethical and
otherwise) that Muslims required answers to after the Prophet's death. The second is the
speed at which the religion's political and religious authority expanded which meant that
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there was a need for the documentation of Islamic tradition.88 These two reasons
presented a problem at such an early stage which was solved with the creation of differing
methods of documentation of the Qur'an and Sunna as well as different schools of thought
and schisms. These schools tried to provide answers to the diversity of questions posed by
the Muslim community at that time. These eventually resulted in the madhāhib which are
now notably known as the four main Sunni schools of thought and whose origins can be
traced to two groups mainly ahl-ra'y and ahl al-hadith.89 While other groups and factions
may have contributed to what we see now as the conventional or traditionalist's view on
Islam, this section focuses on these two groups in particular. What follows is a brief
elaboration on these two groups and how their thoughts and debates have shaped and
created a paradigm shift in looking at Islamic tradition.

With the two challenges facing the Muslim community: the documentation of Islamic
tradition and the attempts to answer varying questions using the available sources; an
examination of what is considered to be a constituent of Islamic tradition and what is not
took place. A process of traditionalization of Islamic thought started taking place. What
was considered to be a constituent of Sunna was now determined more by the written
collections that were systematically collected by those referred to as muhadithin/ ahl al
hadith.90 Prophetic model challenged other Sunnan and ra’y even though it was “often the
case that the sunnan and ra’y constituted the subject matter from which the content of the
Prophetic narrative was itself derived. Prophetic hadith was a logical substitution for
these sources.”91 This process had certain consequences on the use and applicability of
ra'y/opinion in the day-to-day problems and rulings made by jurists who adopted the
outlook of ahl al-hadith; that is, that 'aql and ra'y became less depended on than in earlier
phases. Ahl al-hadith also had a more practical outlook on the application of Sunna.
Greater focus was given to the practice of revivification of Sunna (’ihya’as-Sunna)
ignoring the spirit of the text itself.92
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The effect of hadithification on the understanding of the scope of Sunna can be better
conceptualized by considering how Sunna was initially viewed as engulfing what was
defined as " a general, not systematically defined, behavioral practice of the early
Muslim community predominantly formulated, preserved, and transmitted either orally or
in actu independent of its any written recording."93 This understanding of the effect that
ahl al-hadith had on the scope of Sunna sheds some light on the difference in philosophy
between them and between ahl al ra'y and the madhhab-based fuqahā’. Throughout the
eighth century, Iraqi, Syrian, and Medinese scholars utilized ra’y extensively when
reasoning; ra’y “encompassed a variety of inferential methods that ranged from loose
reasoning to arguments of a strictly logical type, such as analogy or the argumentum a
fortiori.”94 The madhhab-based fuqahā’, though proponents of using ra'y, did not use it
liberally, but only to a certain extent using tools such as qiyās, preference (istihsan) and
speculation (nazar).95 Resorting to these methods was only in the cases where no clear or
close verdict was found in Qur'an and Sunna. The scope of Sunna and the types of hadith
used, however, were defined differently by them in comparison to ahl al-hadith's
definition of the scope of Sunna.96 A criticism of the madhhab-based approach by ahl alhadith in those centuries, however, was the existence and application of the concept of
taqlīd, whereby jurists formulated new interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunna but only
within the framework of the madhab-based legal theory hermeneutic.97 This mechanism
was perceived as an innovation (bid‘ah) since it places equal weight on both a Qur'anic or
sacred prophetic text and an opinion voiced by a later faqīh. Islamic legal theory as we
know it today is a manifestation of the traditionist-rationalist synthesis that developed
following the inquisition (Mihna);98 the theory was completely established by the tenth
century though most legal doctrine was collected and in place by late 8th century. The
inquisition represented the zenith of the struggle between traditionists “whose cause Ibn
Hanbal [d.241/855] was seen to champion, and the rationalists, headed by the caliphs and
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the Mu’tazilites, among whom there were many Hanafites.”99 The shift from practicebased Sunna to formal hadith brought conformity to the new single universal prophetic
model that was fully developed during the rise of the traditionist movement.100 As the
influence of prophetic authority increased, the authority of ra’y and other Sunnan
diminished.101 A clear pattern of affiliation of scholars with one of the two movements
emerged by the middle of the ninth century.

2. Marriage in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence:

This section examines how the contractual elements of marriage are conceptualized in
Islamic law treatises. The legal translation of the rules governing slavery are relevant to
the arena of marriage and make it intelligible. The purpose here is to highlight how
slavery, as a part of the functioning legal framework, applies to interfaith marriages. This
is because slavery has been essential in institutionalizing male authority and hierarchical
gender rights in the family based on unequal but mutual exchanges.
Nikāh occupied a central place in Islamic legal discourse. The fuqahā’ elaborated on the
rules of contracting marriage, and those that govern husband and wife rights and duties
after marriage. This centrality of marriage in Islamic legal discourse can partially be
attributed to the Qur’an and Prophetic tradition, the primary sources of Islamic law.
According to Q. 4:1; 7:189; 39.6, God created the first human being and its mate (zawj)
from one soul (nafs). Semantically, the word, azwāj (literally pair), has been defined by
Ibn al-Qayyim despite his conservativism, as the two things that are similar, homologous,
and equal.102 Marriage is presented in Islamic tradition and legal discourse as a path to
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contentedness and wellbeing; a foundation of social order and communal harmony.103
Marriage served both individual and social purposes by safeguarding chastity and
protecting the lineage. In other Qur’anic verses, rules were laid out with regards to
suitable suitors (Q. 2:220. Q. 2:221 and 4:22-23), marriage arrangements (Q. 2:235), and
marital rights and duties (Q. 4:34).104 Hadith literature introduced some contentious
material leading to the development of legal doctrine concerning the position of women
in the marriage.
‘Aqd al-nikāh (and lawful forms of concubinage) legalized sexual relations in Islamic
Law. Within this basic definition of ‘aqd al nikāh, fuqahā’ provided various analyses.
Khalil ibn ’Ishāq, a Maliki faqīh, emphasized that ‘aqd al-nikāh allowed for husband’s
enjoyment of his wife’s body.105 A Hanafi faqīh, Al- Marghinanī (d.593/1197) outlines
the position of the Hanafi madhab stating that “for us marriage is ownership by way of
owning sexual pleasure in a person and this right is established by marriage and because
there is room for the metaphor, the marriage contract can be made using the terms used in
a sale transaction but not in terms of rent or terms of writing a will.”106 Marriage was
regarded as a form of ownership (milk) based on a contract that brings about
interdependent gender-based rights and responsibilities. This interchange of claims did
not indicate equal status between husband and wife. A husband had more rights with
regards to “divorce, polygamy, and the settlement of marital conflicts.”107 A husband’s
milk over his wife and particularly her sexual organ (farj, bud’) was obtained in exchange
for the dowry (mahr).108 These views of marriage illustrate the extent to which the
dimension of sexuality was dominant in the fuqahā’ understanding of the marital
relationship. In contrast to their lengthy discussions and emphasis on money and sexual
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enjoyment as core values determining the nature of the relationship between the spouses,
the fuqahā’ did not elaborate in their statements and rulings on the importance of other
non-contractual aspects of the marriage. Aspects of marital relations such as good
treatment (husn al ‘ishra), affection (mawwada), mercy(rahma), harmony, and other
ethical values that must be observed by both parties in order to achieve a good conjugal
life remained outside the realm of the legal.
Some of the fuqahā’ also made analogies between unilateral divorce (talāq) and
manumission.109 In his Iḥyāʼʻulūm al-dīn, Imam Ghazālī (d.505/1111) writes that “it is
incumbent upon the guardian also to examine the qualities of the husband and to look
after his daughter so as not to give her in marriage to one who is ugly, ill-mannered, weak
in faith, negligent in upholding her rights, or unequal to her in descent [He then cites
Prophetic tradition, Marriage is enslavement]… Exercising caution on her behalf is
important, because she becomes a slave by marriage and cannot be freed from it, while
the husband is able to obtain divorce at all times.”110 He further adds that “whoever gives
his daughter in marriage to a person who is unjust, licentious, heretical, or an inebriate
commits a crime against his religion and exposes himself to the wrath of God for having
severed his parental tie by having made a bad choice.”111 Formative-period fuqahā’ and
many of their disciples utilized “overlapping linguistic, conceptual, and legal parallels
between marriage, slavery, and ownership.”112 Sexual agency was seen as a characteristic
of manhood; once he became a husband a male slave was even granted many masculine
prerogatives that distinguished him from a female slave.

In transacting marriage, the question of whether a woman was able to contract the
marriage herself was also a controversial issue. It presented another aspect of what
defines male and female for the fuqahā’ when it comes to validating a marriage contract,
Abū Hāmid Al-Ghazālī, The Revival of the Religious Sciences (Jun.2007), available
athttp://www.ghazali.org/works/marriage.htm.
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resulting in a clearer idea and a full picture of how the social status and role of woman is
constructed in the marital household. From the very beginning, a female lacked the
capacity to grant sexual access to herself. Al-Muzanī (d.264/876) stated that a woman’s
“sexual organ is forbidden before the contract and it is never made lawful except that the
marriage guardian says ‘I have married her to you.’”113 In the Mudawanna, wilāyat al
nikāh was seen as essential in determining legitimacy of the marriage since the guardian
(waliyy) has a share in and authority over the female’s bud’.114 The guardian should
therefore oversee the transfer of this authority to the husband. In Al-Mabsūt, Imam
Sarakhsī highlights the importance of the suitability requirement in particular of the
groom (kafā’a); he says that even if the suitor turns out to be of a higher social status than
what he informed the guardian and his daughter after the marriage has occurred, both the
guardian and the daughter have no choice but that she stay with the husband. To Sarakhsī
it is “as if he [the guardian] has bought something that is defective but found that it is in
fact fit and undamaged.”115 In a second scenario, Sarakhsī indicates a case in which the
suitor conveys to the guardian and his daughter that he is of a higher social status but then
they later learn that the husband is equal to them in social status. In this case, the guardian
has no right to separate them since the requirement of kafā’a has been attained.
Nevertheless, the wife may request a separation since the increased benefit of the husband
being of a higher social status, an aspect of her acceptance of the marriage, does not exist.
Sarakhsī adds that intercourse is a form of degradation for the woman, thus “a woman
might accept intercourse with a man who is better than her, but not with a man who is
equal to her. Hence, if a man misguides a woman with vain hopes, her lack of complete
satisfaction is apparent and so the matter is left to her preference.”116 Al- Sarakhsī
emphasizes that the purposes (maqāsid) which nikāh encompasses, including
companionship (sohba), intimacy (‘ishra), familiarity (’ulfa), and establishment of
kinship (ta’sīs al qarābāt) can only exist when suitability (kafā’a) is attained. AlSarakhsī argues that:
the acquisition of a woman is a form of humiliation (al mulk ‘ala al mar’ah zillah), and
to it the Prophet (PBUH) pointed: ‘Marriage is enslavement let everyone of you weigh
113
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carefully [to whom] he enslaves his daughter,’ and self-humiliation is prohibited
[harām] for the Prophet (PBUH) stated: ‘No believer may humiliate himself,’ yet what
has been allowed from it is allowed for the purpose of necessity (darūra), and in having
intercourse with who is not suitable for her is further humiliation (ziyādat al zul) to the
woman and there is no darūra for this additional humiliation and for this kafā’a has
been considered.117

3. Riqq in Islamic Jurisprudence:
R.q.q. is the root for yariqq or raqīqa, the plural forms of which include riqāq or raqā’iq.
In Arabic riqq can mean: delicate, enhanced, thin, tender, gentle, kind, weak, and
vulnerable. Ibn Manzụ̄r in his explanation describes the female as raqīqa. Raqqa another
word from riqq means that a person has become a slave; Abu Abbas mentions that a slave
is described as tender/vulnerable (raqīq or raqīqa) because he/she is humiliated by and
subjected to his/her respective owner.118 In the Qur’an, numerous words are used to refer
to a slave, yet each has a specialized usage. ‘abd is one of the terms rarely used in the
Qur’an to discuss slaves and is more often used to mean servant or worshipper.119 The
root meaning of the word is thought to refer to labor in other languages such as Hebrew.
Thus, the word used to refer to a slave or a laborer came later to also mean a worshipper
serving God. Historical evidence also shows that the logic of worship associated with the
word ‘abd came to the Arabs from their pre-Islamic neighbors.120 In the Qur’an, slaves,
specifically female concubines, are also mentioned using the periphrasis ma malakat
’aymānukum. Raqaba was used when emancipation was indicated (tahrīr raqaba). It is
important to note here that the words jāriya and raqīqa were not mentioned in the
Qur’anic text at all.121

Despite its canonizing the distinction between the free and the slave (Q. 16:71), the
Qur’an recommended equality between the free and the slave, generosity (Q. 24:33), and
kindness towards slaves as well as marrying them off. This occurred as the Qur’anic text
117
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came to disregard some of the rules that existed before Islam disfavoring women and
slaves, but did nothing to change their status in the societal structure; a structure that as its
basis, necessitates a hierarchical relationship between both man and woman and master
and slave. Female slave prostitution was limited and non-marital intercourse with female
slaves was regulated. Placing slaves in the category of the weak and vulnerable was also
unique to the Qur’an. Despite parallel Roman, Christian, and Jewish practices, the
Qur’an envisioned the most progressive rules at the time regarding slavery.122

To further understand how a concept such as riqq has influenced the logical argument
against interfaith marriage, a detailed examination of aspects such as slavery and
concubinage is a must. Both were commonplace during the Abbasid era –an era during
which much of the canonical texts in Islam came to light. This understanding is necessary
to fully appreciate how such practices may have affected the perception of gender roles
and women in general. This becomes particularly important when contrasted with the
existing perceptions and practices that prevailed during the first century. Leila Ahmed
creates such a contrast in her book, Women and Gender in Islam in her discussion of the
process by which the perception of women and their real life scope of power changed
with the movement of the political and social capital of Islam from Arabia to
Mesopotamia and the advent of the conquests and the consequent wealth brought to
Muslims at that time. The next section highlights how such changes have taken place and
how they have affected the mindsets and texts that came out during this era.

During the first and second Islamic centuries, the concept of slavery was one that had
changed only slightly in Arabia mainly due to Islamic teachings calling for a kinder and
more generous treatment of slaves.123 The emancipation of slaves was viewed as an act of
piety and thus was highly encouraged.124 The position of slaves in society was one that
rendered them as second-class family members and private servants. This position later
changed in the Abbasid and Umayyad eras as the number of slaves per person jumped
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exponentially from tens to thousands.125 With such an exponential increase in numbers,
the importance and significance of slaves decreased in society, as well as the significance
of freeing them.126 The usage and treatment of slaves was also something that changed
drastically. Originally, slaves were used for finishing private errands or militarily. By the
time of the Abbasid era their usage ranged from being entertainers to laborers finishing
public projects by the state.127 While the kind, fair, and generous treatment of slaves and
support for their emancipation was something that was encouraged in the first centuries,
by the Abbasid era the treatment of slaves, especially concubines, had deteriorated
significantly alongside their status.128

By the beginning of the Abbasid era the social structure of the relationship between men
and women had changed. Men had an upper hand in their exercise of power over women
as the conquests had created an abundance in the supply of women and children in the
slaves markets.129 It had thus become easier to "obtain" a female slave/ concubine than to
find a wife with all the obligations that entailed.130 With this becoming a widespread
phenomenon among the elite men of the Abbasid era, the women, who came from
varying backgrounds and creeds and thus had an effect on the infiltration of their customs
and its integration with Muslim customs, resorted to less outspoken methods of
maintaining their social, psychological and material wellbeing amongst the other
concubines or wives in one household. They were less outspoken in contrast to methods
used by Muslim wives in Arabia during the first and second Hijri centuries, were more
"forthright" in their demanding contractual rights, bringing to light the extent to which
their scope of power within the household had become limited if not non-existent.131

The abundance of female slavery and concubinage had other negative impacts besides
limiting the scope of female power. Ahmed elaborates on how women had come to be
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viewed as objects of sexual interest. Such a view may have been what later affected "[t]he
weight Abbasid society gave to the androcentric teachings over the ethical teachings in
Islam" and thus was what was reflected inadvertently in written works and interpretations
of Qur'anic texts which provided the licensing for such misogynist practices to prevail
during that era.

4. Marriage as enslavement in IFM Regulations:
The purpose of this section is to show that how interfaith marriage regulations in Islamic
tradition lack a uniform representation and how these regulations are largely based on two
factors: marriage as enslavement of the wife and the nature and status of the religious
other in the Islamic tradition. This section will examine marriage as enslavement in IFM
regulations. It surveys the readings and views of prominent early and classical period
fuqahā’ on and mufassirūn of how an ideal interfaith marriage between a Muslim and the
religious other should be. A lack of uniformity is noticed while carrying out this survey of
authoritative fiqh and tafsīr works on interfaith marriage between a Muslim woman and a
Kitābī man. The fuqahā’ and mufassirūn dealt differently with the type and scope of
influence and authority a husband had over his wife, and the divergent textual evidence
used to support the prohibition. This highlights again the inherent ambiguity of the text
and the possibility of alternative readings.
In the Mudawwana,132 a tradition was transmitted that Sa‘īd bin Musayyib (d.94/715), a
prominent Muslim faqīh who headed al-hadith school established in Hijāz particularly in
Medinah and one of the tābi‘ūn (generation succeeding the companions/sahāba), said:
"Do not marry the polytheist to a believer even if she were an adulteress."133 In Mālik’s
Mudawwana a tradition is mentioned "from Sufyān Al- Thawrī from Yazīd ibn Abī Ziya,
who heard from Zaid bin Wahba Juhtānī that he said that Omar bin al-Khattāb wrote: The
Muslim man marries a Christian woman whereas a Christian man does not marry a
Al Mudawwana al- Kubra is a collection of Imam Mālik Ibn ’Anas’ (d.179/ 795) views on jurisprudential
matters that Ibn Al-Qāsim (d.191/806) attributed to Imam Mālik and then reached Sahnun Al-Tanukhī
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9th century.
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Muslim woman.”134 Yazīd bin ’Iyād also reported that he heard from Ali ibn Abī Tālib
who said: The Jewish and Christian man do not marry a Muslim woman,” and from
Rubay’a that he said: “It is not permissible for a Christian man to marry a free Muslim
woman.” 135 Mālik also said “Do not you see that the Muslim woman may not be married
[la yankihuhā] to a Kitābī and in the case where a Christian [nasrāniyya] wife under [the
authority of, tahta] a Christian [nasrānī] husband converts to Islam, the husband would
still have her [amlakubihā] until the end of her ‘idda [waiting period].136 Nevertheless if a
Christian [nasrāni] initiated a marriage [nikāh] with a Muslim woman, the marriage is
null and void.”137 In his work, Mālik also points that a marriage between a Muslim man
and a Scriptural woman is permissible though frowned upon (makruh).138 Concerns thus
existed regarding the influence that a non-Muslim wife could have on her Muslim
husband and children. Malik justified his dislike for a Muslim’s marriage to a Scriptural
woman stating that she “eats pork and drinks wine; he copulates with her and kisses her,
while this is in her mouth; she bears him children, feeds them according to her religion,
gives them forbidden food to eat and wine to drink.”139

In his seminal and formative work al-’Umm, al-Shāfi‘ī (d. 204/820) also raises the
questions of whether the mushrikīn prohibited to Muslims in Q. 2:221 include Ahl alkitāb or not. He cites the opinions of both the proponents and the opponents. Then he
asserts that if the verse had been revealed to prohibit the marriage of Muslim women only
to those mushrikīn who are idolaters, “Muslim women are also prohibited to the
mushrikīn of Ahl al-kitāb.”140 This al-Shāfi‘ī says is because Allah has prohibited
guardianship (wilāyah) between Muslims and Mushrikīn.141

134

Id. at 212.
Id.
136
Id. at 213.
137
Id. at 212.
138
‘ABD AL-RAHMĀN AL-JAZĪRĪ, 4 AL FIQH ‘ALA AL-MADHĀHIB AL- ’ARBA‘A 72-4 (Dār al-kutub al ‘ilmiyya
2003).
139
Al-Mudawwana cited in YOHANAN FRIEDMANN, TOLERANCE AND COERCION IN ISLAM 182 (Cambridge
University Press 2003).
140
MUHẠMMAD IBN IDRĪS AL-SHĀFIʻĪ, 5 KITĀB AL-UMM 7 (Dār al-ma‘rifah 1990).
141
Id.,
135

38

Jurisprudents need to add religious legitimacy to the solutions they have chosen and the
rulings they have extrapolated from a specific historical context. It is this task that pushed
them to search for prophetic sayings (’ahādith) that addressed the issue of marriage
whether as a contract or a practice. This need also pushed them to explore the lives and
works of their predecessors for foundations on which to build their own rulings. These
jurisprudents have made it an objective to tie every ruling with similar evidence from the
Qur'an and Sunna. Of these ’ahādith was that of which Tabarī was the only narrator
saying: “From Al-Hassan, from Jabir Ibn ‘Abdallah, he said: The Prophet (PBUH) said:
“We may marry a woman from the People of the Book but they may not marry Muslim
women.”” Al-Tabarī commented on this hadith saying: "This hadith and with what
disagreement there is regarding its ’isnād, is yet accepted given the general consensus/’
‘ijmā’ of the ’ummah on its reliability".142
The part of the verse in which Muslim women are also instructed not to marry mushrikīn
according to al-Tabarī is read by one of the followers of al tābi’ūn as being directed to
their guardians. Al-Tabarī states that the part of the verse Q 2:221“wa la tankihu al
mushrikāt” is a divine command for men not to marry polytheist women and the
statement “wa la tankihu al mushrikīn” from the same verse is also a statement for men to
preserve their honor by not marrying off their daughters to mushrikīn. Tabarī evokes an
opinion from Ja‘far Mohamed bin ‘Ali that states that the latter part of the verse is further
textual evidence of wilāyah.” Al-Tabarī clearly states his position in his tafsīr that Q. 5:5
does not abrogate Q. 2:221 because the latter originally addressed the polytheists of
Arabia. This technically means that the Qur’an is silent on the matter though al-Tabarī
does not mention it explicitly; instead he cites two prophetic traditions one of which there
is disagreement over its ‘isnad to bring in textual evidence for the prohibition of an
interfaith marriage between a Muslim woman and a Kitābī man.143 In his Ahkam alQur’an, al-Qurtubī states: “do not marry the Muslim women to the mushrik, and the
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Ummah had unanimously agreed that a mushrik is not to marry a Muslim woman at all
for what disparagement such an act would have on Islam.”144
On the prohibition of an interfaith marriage between a Muslim woman and a Kitābī, AlMāturīdī’s (d.333/944) work offers some of the earliest reflections on the prohibition. AlMāturīdī’s states that “Unbelievers do (but) beckon you to the Fire, and the women do not
preach their husbands, but preaching is originally for husbands, and they are the rulers
(‘umara’ ‘ala azwājihinna) over their wives and women are among the followers and
humiliated in their hands therefore it was permissible for Muslim men to enter an
interfaith marriage with a Kitābiyyah.”145 In his work, al-Khallāl (d.311/923) mentions
that Ibn Hanbal also rejects the continuation of a marriage where a Kitābiyyah embraces
Islam, justifying this by stating that “we can own them but they cannot own us
[namlikuhum walā yamlikūna).”146
Ibn Hazm (d.456/1046) has also devoted his effort to collect the ’ahādith that have been
transmitted by the narrators about the sīrah of ‘umar Ibn Al Khattāb, who was known for
his strict stance on the marriage of Muslims with non-Muslims generally and his
insistence on the separation between married couples once the woman converted to Islam.
Concerning revoking the marital contract of a woman whose husband has apostatized, Ibn
Hazm states: "From ‘Umar as well, a third saying that we have narrated through Hammād
Ibn Salamah through Dawud At-Tai'i, through Ziyād Ibn Abd al-Rahman that Hanzalah
Ibn Beshr married his daughter when she was a Muslim to a Christian nephew of his – to
this Auf Ibn al-Qa‘qa‘ rode to ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattāb and told him of such, to this ‘Umar
wrote : If he converts then she is his wife (’imrā'atuhu) and if he does not then they are to
be separated. And he, the husband, did not, so they were separated.147 He also wrote on an
interfaith marriage between a Muslim woman and a Kitābī that it was prohibited and
added in the same sentence “and also prohibited is the ownership of a Master who is an
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unbeliever (kāfir) of Muslim slave.”148 He cites both Q. 2:221 and the verse Q. 4:441
which states: “And never will Allah grant to the Unbelievers a way (to triumph) over the
Believers.”149 He goes on to cite traditions regarding how slaves who were once owned
by unbelievers were freed as soon as they converted to Islam. This shows that Ibn Hazm
did not simply analogize between husband and master and wife and slave to make the
prohibition comprehensible. Rather, Ibn Hazm took a further step by using these
traditions as complementary textual evidence to confirm why Muslim women cannot
marry any non-Muslim: He cites a tradition from Yazīd ibn ‘Alqamah, that ‘Ubadah ibn
al-Nou‘mān al-Teghlībī married a woman of Banī Tamīm and she converted to Islam, and
to this ‘Umar said to him: Either you convert to Islam or we take her away from you
(nantazi‘uha mink), and he refused so ‘Umar took her away from him... Ibn Hazm cites
another tradition as supporting textual evidence: “through Hammād ibn Zaid ibn ’Ayyūb
al-Sikhtiyyānī from ‘Ikrimah from Ibn 'Abbas that he said that if the Jewish, or the
Christian woman converts to Islam under the Jew or the Christian: They are to be
separated: Islam supersedes and cannot be superseded. And with this Hammād Ibn Zayd
gives a fatwa: “from Abd al-Razek from Abū az-Zubayr that he heard Jabir ibn Abd Allah
saying: The woman of the people of the book are allowed for us (to marry) and our
woman are forbidden for them (to marry).”150
In his authoritative work fatāwa, in the chapter “nikāh al-kufār,” Ibn-Taymīyah
(d.728/1328) who rejects the taqlīd- hermeneutic, makes a clear analogy between nikāh
and riqq. Ibn-Taymīyah says that “marriage is only a form of enslavement while
concubinage is all enslavement.” He states that enslavement is a ‘illah for concubinage,
and so it is kufr (whether the master is polytheist or from Ahl al-kitāb) that can act as
impediment to owning a Muslim slave whether male or female, but in marriage it is the
element of enslavement that can act as an impediment to a marriage between a Muslim
and a non-Muslim (provided that the person is from Ahl al-kitāb).151 It is the aspect of
enslavement in the marital relationship further embedded in Islamic tradition by the
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reading of other verses that helps stabilize the consensus on the prohibition of marriages
between Muslim women and non-Muslim men.
In his jurisprudential work Ahḳām ahl al-dhimmah which deals with the laws governing
Christian, Jewish, and Sabean subjects of the Muslim state, 14th century Hanbali jurist
and scholar, Shams El Dīn Ibn al-Qayyim (d.751/1350), states that "it is not permissible
for a Zoroastrian or a pagan man to override a woman whose religion is better than his; a
dhimmi man too cannot marry (yankih) a Muslim woman."152 Ibn Kathīr, a close student
of Ibn al-Qayyim, has included in some of his works biographical details on the latter. A
disciple of Ibn Taymiyyah (d.728/1328), Ibn al-Qayyim was deeply intertwined with the
religious polemics that the former had with his rivals. Ibn Taymīyah’s literalist and
formalistic approach primarily counted on the precepts and the exact wording of the
Qur’an and the hadith tradition with regards to the Prophet and his Companions. With
regards to the currently established rule demanding that marriages between two
disbelievers be annulled if the wife coverts to Islam, a variety of opinions exist. Ibn alQayyim mentions a period in the development of Sharī’ah before God commanded jihad
where, when the wife converted to Islam in her marriage with a disbeliever, the marriage
was not annulled. He mentions an incident where ‘Umar ibn al Khattāb handled the case
of two married Christian spouses where the wife converted to Islam. ‘Umar gave the
woman the option of either leaving or staying with her husband. Ibn al Qayyim elaborates
on “staying” stating that it does not indicate “that she remains under him while he is
Christian, yet she can wait until he converts to Islam, and whenever he does, then she is
his wife, even if the situation does not change for years.” This is also the opinion of Ibn
Taymīyah. She thus, is not permitted to resume conjugal relations with her husband, yet if
she chooses to stay in her husband’s home she is entitled to support (al-nafaqa wa alsukna). Another tradition related to the authority of Ibn Abbas states that “God sent
Muhammad with the truth to make it prevail over all religion(s). Our religion is the best
of religions and our faith stands above all others. Our men are above their women, but
their men are not be above our women.”153 The fact that opinions existed allowing a
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woman to stay with her non-Muslim husband and receive nafaqa can lead to arguing that
the proponents of this position depicted the element of enslavement in the conjugal
relation itself and in the husband’s wilāyah to restrict his wife’s mobility for this purpose.
However, other opinions suggest that the prohibition holds due to man’s authority in
marriage and the result of which can lead to the wife’s conversion

5. Kufr, Shirk, and Ahl al-kitāb in IFM Regulations:
The fuqahā’ and mufassirūn dealt differently with issues such as what constitutes kufr or
shirk and how to categorize Ahl al-kitāb. The understanding of these concepts is firmly
connected to how interfaith marriages are regulated in Islamic legal discourse. In his
Lisān al-‘Arab, Ibn-Manzụ̄r states several meanings of the word kufr. He says that the
word is used to describe people of dār al-harb, a concept used to refer to territory where
Islamic law is not in force.154 This is because “they disobeyed and abstained from
God.”155 He also states that kufr is the denial of grace and thus is the antithesis of
gratitude. The word was also used to refer to the act of concealing something so as to
destroy it (takfīr).156 Later when God’s grace came to be reflected in Islam, the word was
tied with the act of denying God’s grace. A kāfir, thus, was seen as a person “who
received God’s benevolence, [but] shows no sign of gratitude in his conduct, or even acts
rebelliously against his benefactor.”157 In discussing the meaning of kufr as denial of
dogma, Farid Esack argues that the Qur’an always links kufr to doctrine within “a real
socio-historical context… that [for example] denying God is connected to breaking
promises and spreading corruption (2:28) and denying the resurrection [is connected to]
the refusal to spend part of their [unbelievers] wealth on the poor (41:7). Esack also
illustrates that the term kufr was used in several occasions in the Qur’an (Q. 2:146, Q.
6:20, Q. 2:42, 159, and 147) to describe a person “who has actually recognized the unity
of God and Muhammad as his prophet, but who, nevertheless, willfully refuses to
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acknowledge it.” A third understanding of kufr that is denounced by the Qur’an comes in
the form of antagonism towards Islam and Muslims. Esack marks a distinction between
this and mere “disagreement with reified, particularly contemporary, Islam or opposing
socio-religious communities known as Muslims.”158 Finally, Esack highlights the
Qur’an’s specificity with regards to the choice of the kufār to refrain from confessing
belief. Believing in Islam entailed a radical change in values, personal life, and socioeconomic relations rather than just a mental shift to another set of ideas. The Qur’an, thus,
states that they opted for kufr “because of narrow material gains (21:53; 26:74; 31:21),
tribal bonds (43:22) and because Islam would disturb the unjust social order (3:21).”159

This discussion of the concept of kufr is important and relevant to interfaith marriage
regulations since kufr in classical tafsīr literature was seen to characterize “all those who
by choice or accident of birth belong to or identify with that community irrespective of
the differences that may separate its diverse components.”160 In examining how the
concept of kufr is used in classical tafsīr of Q. 3:21, mufassirūn including ‘Ibn ‘Arabī, alRazī, and al-Zamakhsharī are seen to be imprisoning the religious other in collective
guilt. This is not the case in classical modernist modernist’s tafsīr, Rashīd Ridā.161 Q.
3:21 states: “As to those who deny the Signs of Allah, and in defiance of right, slay the
prophets, and slay those who teach just dealing with mankind, announce to them a
grievous penalty”.162 This text is seen to refer to a time when the Jews supposedly slew
prophets who were sent to them. The verse however, in classical tafsīr literature, is seen
to apply to all Jews as a community even if it were their predecessors who were
responsible for these acts.163
On mushrikīn and whether Ahl al-kitāb are included in the prohibition in Q.
2:221, Muqātil in his tafsīr defines a believing slave as one who believes in the
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oneness of God (musadiq bi tawhīd ’Allah).164 He re-emphasizes his point in his
reading of Q. 5:5. In his tafsīr of the verse Q. 2:221, al-Zajjāj (d.311/923)
defines a mushrik as one “who disbelieves in the prophet and who disbelieves in
the prophet is in turn denying that the Qur’an that was revealed to the Prophet is
from God and thus claims that another but God came with what comes only from
God .” This is where association of others with God (’ishrāk bi Allah) occurs.
Thus, he considers Kitābiyīn to also be mushrikīn.165
Abu Bakr al-Kāsānī, (d. 587/1191), the later Hanafi faqīh who wrote Badāʼiʻ alsạnāʼiʻ fī tartīb al-sharāʼiʻ, one of the best compilations in Hanafi fiqh, stated
regarding interfaith marriages between Muslim men and non-Muslim women,
that it was impermissible for a Muslim to marry a disbeliever (kāfira) according
to the verse 2:221. However a Muslim man is allowed to marry a Kitābiyyah
woman according to Q.5:5. Al-Kāsānī uses the word kāfira which is more
general than the word mushrik used in Q. 2:221. Many fuqahā’ use both words
interchangeably, nevertheless kufr constitutes disbelieving what constitutes part
of faith, while shirk refers specifically to associating in faith with God idols and
other creatures. He argues that interfaith marriage between Muslims and the
latter category of disbelievers would cause a religious enmity between spouses
and thus defeat the purpose of marriage in finding tranquility in the other spouse
and achieving harmony, affection, and mercy between them.166

On the other hand, al-Kāsānī states that a Kitābiyyah believes in books and messages of
prophets and apostles in whole; this faith however is rescinded as a faith that is not yet
complete. Complete faith can still be achieved by those who already base their faith on
evidence rather than personal inclinations. And so in marrying a Kitābiyyah, a Muslim
man plays a role in "alert[ing] her to the facts of the matter,” presenting Islam to her,
offering her thus a chance to embrace the religion, a ramification that al-Kāsānī believes
164
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is a decent and worthy justification for the permissibility of these interfaith unions.167 In
other words, al-Kāsānī believes that this justification would not exist in an interfaith
marriage with a polytheist woman whose choice to remain so indicates her forfeiture of
existing evidence and thus would not consider it if presented to her.
He outlines Imam Shāfi’ī’s consideration of a Kitābiyyah as a polytheist since Ahl alkitāb too associate in faith with God other entities.168 Al-Shāfi’ī presents the verses from
the Qur’an which explicitly mention this; “The Jews say, "Ezra is the son of Allah "; and
the Christians say, "The Messiah is the son of Allah." That is their statement from their
mouths; they imitate the saying of those who disbelieved [before them],”169 and
“They have certainly disbelieved who say, “Allah is the third of three." And there is no
god except one God.”170

He follows with the conclusion that Ahl al-kitāb were included in the general statement
made on polytheists in Q. 2:221. And that Q.5:5 constitutes engaging with
particularization of a general statement making interfaith marriages between Muslim men
and free Kitābiyyāt permissible (that is to say that interfaith marriages between Muslim
men and Kitābiyyāt slaves fell under the genre meant in the general statement and was
thus prohibited).171 Nevertheless, Imam Al-Kasani states that even if Ahl al-kitāb as a
matter of fact are polytheists, both groups were addressed separately in the text of the
Qur’an; “Neither those who disbelieve from the People of the Scripture nor the
polytheists wish that any good should be sent down to you from your Lord,”172 and “[…]
they who disbelieved among the People of the Scripture and the polytheists”173
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Al- Kāsānī uses the same verse which he states as not encompassing Ahl al-kitāb to
support the asymmetric prohibition of a marriage between a Muslim woman and a nonMuslim man Q. 2:221: "And do not marry polytheistic men [to your women] until they
believe.” He justifies this by explaining that even though Q. 2:221 refers specifically to
polytheists, yet the cause (‘illah) behind the prohibition, which is that “Those invite [you]
to the Fire,” includes all disbelievers, thus the prohibition is generalized to include even
Ahl al-kitāb.174 He argues that since there is fear, that in the marriage of a Muslim woman
to a non-Muslim man, the Muslim woman would fall into disbelief since the non-Muslim
man invites her to his religion, and with regards to habits or customs women usually
follow men's inclinations towards certain actions, and emulate/ imitate them in their
religion. They invite Muslim women to disbelief and the invitation to disbelief is an
invitation to the Fire and since disbelief substantiates fire, then the marriage of a nonMuslim man to a Muslim woman was deemed a reason leading to the forbidden and so
became forbidden [in itself].

Thus, it is not permissible to marry a Muslim woman to one of the people of the book, nor
is it permissible to marry her to a Pagan or a Zoroastrian since God's commands/
prescriptions has prevented the guardianship (wilāyah) of disbelievers over believers with
Almighty's saying: “And never will Allah grant to the unbelievers a way (to triumphs)
over the believers.”175 And so had the marriage of a non-Muslim man to a Muslim
woman been permissible he would be seen has having” a way (to triumph) over" her and
that is not permitted.
Here, al-Kāsānī has used analogy (qiyās) where a common ‘illah has been identified
between the original case (impermissibility of marriages between Muslim women and
Polytheist men) and the new case (marriages between Muslim women and Scriptural
men).Once identified, the same ruling is applied without any interference or change. In
order for a jurist to carry out the exercise of analogy as with the case above, there are
three requirements: the original case which analogy seeks to extend to a new situation,
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the new case on which a ruling is needed, the ‘illah which is a constant attribute of the
original case, and the ruling governing the original case which is to be extended to the
new case.176 In order to constitute a basis for the analogical deduction, the ruling to be
extended must be rational.177 According to the majority of the ‘ulama’, ‘illah is “a
constant attribute which is applicable to all cases without being affected by differences of
persons, time, place and circumstances.”178 In doing so, the majority of the ‘ulama’
establish a difference between the effective cause of the ruling (‘illah) and the objective
of the ruling (hikmah) itself. Other jurists from the Maliki and Hanbali madhāhib stated
otherwise, indicating that it is enough if the ‘illah has a “reasonable relationship” to the
ruling.179 The question here arises whether the gendered understanding of the part of Q.
2:221 that reads “Unbelievers do (but) beckon you to the Fire” constitutes sufficient ‘illah
for prohibiting Muslim women from marrying Kitābī men. Can this section of the verse
with all the variety of tradition and the different criteria upon which they are chosen and
interpreted constitute a basis for consensus? Is it even possible to discern ‘ijmā’ of the
jurists in the first two Islamic centuries on the principle of prohibiting Muslim women to
marry Kitābī men? And if so when exactly did this consensus occur and does it fulfill the
criteria of what we now know as ‘ijmā’?

The next section shows how the interpretations of prominent figures such as the early
reformist Muhammad ‘Abduh and neo-traditionalist Sayyid Qutb marked the introduction
of “the modernist development adding the ideology of domesticity and the scientific
justification of biological essentialism through the use of the notion women’s fitrah –
their inborn nature.”180 The section then briefly outlines alternative interpretive strategies
used in contemporary feminist tafsīr works and their application so as produce a more
egalitarian reading of the textual sources when it comes to man’s authority and role and
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status of woman in marriage. A few works examine how the understanding of what
constitutes disbeliever (the other) is constructed.
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III. Qiwwāmah, Shirk, Kufr, and Ahl al-kitāb in IFM Regulations: A Contemporary
Approach:

This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section provides a historical
overview of the modern shifts in interpretive authority and the resultant emergence of
revivalist-modernist movements. It then surveys some of tafsīr works of prominent
figures namely Muhammad ‘Abduh, prominent figure of the classical modernist
movement and Sayyid Qutb who was committed to the neo-traditionalist movement.
Though influenced by classical modernists, neo-traditionalists took a more conservative
turn by dismissing intellectualism as dangerous and considered classical modernists to be
westernized. They also had a much stronger link to pre-modern revivalist movement of
the 18th century particularly Wahhabism. Despite that, neo-traditionalists had a more
critical stance towards hadith literature. The second section of this chapter then looks at
contemporary interpretations of Q. 4:34 and the concepts of kufr, mushrik, and Ahl alkitāb.

A. Transformation of Islamic Tradition in the Contemporary Era: 18th Century to
the Present
The Islamic modernist movement emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries to establish “synthesis between modern values and systems on one hand, and
what were seen to be eternal Islamic values and systems on the other.”181 The urgent
project of the modernist movement to synchronize Islam with values such as rationality,
science, and democracy came as a result of colonialism and interaction with the Western
world. This led to the reemergence of the rational religious sciences of Islam, the kalām
science.182 Among the most prominent modernist and early reformist figures were Jamal
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al-Afghani (d.1314/1897), Sayyid Ahmed Khan (d.1315/1898), Mohamed ‘Abduh
(d.1323/1905), and Rashīd Ridā (d 1353/ 1935) and Tunisian thinker and reformer alTahir al-Haddad (d.1353/1935). Mohamed ‘Abduh in particular called for a rational
interpretation of the Qur’an and emphasized that science is necessary to understand the
Qur’an; any seeming contradiction between scientific reason and the scripture is a result
of human misreading and could be resolved by reading the text allegorically.183 By
adhering to the Salafi mindset, classical modernists believed in the revivification of the
‘true’ teachings of the Qur’an and Sunna. This revivalism was similarly attained through
the adoption of Ijtihad and the rejection of taqlīd, though the scope and content of the
modernists’ Ijtihad was broader than that of the pre-modern revivalists who adopted the
methodology of the traditionist movement (ahl al-hadith). The former also were less
reliant on the hadith literature. Rashīd Ridā for instance considered the only legitimate
source of Sunna to be the practice based. Furthermore, classical modernists also differed
from their predecessors in their desire to engage with modernity rather than alienating
themselves. Historical context was also important in Qur’anic interpretation for classical
modernists, it was particularly relevant when “the Qur’an used figurative language that
conveyed meanings distinct to the immediate audience of its revelation in Seventhcentury Arabia.” Even though Classical modernists displayed a degree of skepticism to
historicity of hadith, their criticism continued to operate with the classical system of
hadith sciences. The classical modernist movement lacked thus a systematic embedded
methodology and philosophy based on which reform of the Islamic tradition can take
place in a holistic rather than a selective manner. In his Qur’anic commentary, ‘Abduh
left out “theological speculations, the detailed grammatical discussions, and the obtuse
scholarship which characterized the commentaries of the past.” His aim was to make
comprehensible for all Muslims the moral aim of the text. The technical aspects of tafsīr
were thus not emphasized in making meaning of the verses. Later moderate writings of
Muhammad Al-Ghazalī and Yusuf Qaradawī also exhibited a methodological affiliation
with classical modernists.
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The neo-traditionalist Islamist discourse on gender equality and women’s rights
introduces modern constructs that “attempt to remain traditional, while adopting
specifically modern components.”184 Modern elements incorporated in the revivalist
approach of Islamists create new understandings that are neither traditional nor
completely liberal. The modern components can be traced in the gender discourse of an
important number of Egyptian Islamists such as Hassan al-Bannā (d.1368/1949), Sayyid
Qutb (d.1385/1966). The neo-traditionalist movement though much influenced by the
early modern reformist movement, nevertheless its proponents considered the latter to be
too Western. In part they adhered to the essence and methodology of the early reformers
yet they considered intellectualism to be a threat as one of their main objectives was to
distinguishing the religious tradition from the West. In some sense, the neo-traditionalist
movement was drew from eighteenth century Wahhabi thought in that its proponents also
promoted the revivalist approach of following as-salaf and denouncing taqlīd.
Nevertheless, they had a more skeptical approach to hadith than Wahhabis. Writings of
the Islamist figures Yusuf al-Qaradawī and Heba Raouf Ezzat are shown to have their
roots in the writings of earlier Islamists such as al-Bannā and his disciple Qutb. The
Islamist movement of the Muslim Brotherhood encouraged Muslim women to struggle,
alongside men, for the Islamic call (da‘wwah). Women played a role in the social sphere
and in the political sphere for the Islamic cause so long as this did not affect their
domestic role. Nevertheless, Al-Bannā stated that “destroying the integrity of the family
and threatening the happiness of the home” was one of the social causes of the dissolution
of the Islamic state. The Islamist movement developed “its own distinctive gender
discourses, a mixture of traditional religious conservative ideas, alongside modern ones,
producing a new hybrid, neo-traditional gender discourse compatible with its `restorative'
ideological project.”
In his Qur’anic commentary Tafsīr al manār, Muhammad ‘Abduh, the Egyptian
intellectual and author of the treatise Risālat al-tawhīd, argues in his tafsīr of qiwwāmah
184
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verse that God has bestowed upon men strength and power that were not granted to
women, and it is because of this that there are variations in the responsibilities and legal
rulings (’ahkam) between men and women due to the variation in their humanly
disposition and readiness.185 He begins his commentary on the verse with a reminder
“And do not wish for that by which Allah has made some of you exceed others. For men
is a share of what they have earned, and for women is a share of what they have earned.
And ask Allah of his bounty. Indeed Allah is ever, of all things, knowing.”186 He argues
that it is because of their procreation men are entitled with the maintenance, protection
and care of women.187 Consequently, they are instructed to undertake jihad so as to
provide protection, they receive a greater share of inheritance because they spend on their
households. He reasons that Shari’a has honored women since they are granted a dowry
as compensation for their natural state.188 This means that not only do men exceed women
in strength and power by which Allah has made them surpass women, but they also
exceed them materially with what they provide as compensation for this original variation
that will inevitably lead to a hierarchical relationship between the two spouses. This
monetary compensation is meant to satisfy the woman who in ‘Abduh’s words
“voluntarily consents to forgo absolute/formal equality with the man” in matrimony.189
This is because according to ‘Abduh a woman’s disposition would not necessitate that she
accept male authority over her without any kind of compensation.190

He further deconstructs this concept of qiwwāmah by reasoning that a hierarchical
relationship where the woman is subordinate does not mean that she acts according to the
will of the husband or simply does what he directs her to do. He emphasizes her
autonomous character as a person with will and choice. Abduh interprets qiwwāmah as
husband’s guidance and oversight in the wife’s implementation of her duties, observing
her in her work and in upbringing the children.191 He names some of the wife’s duties
which include: keeping the house, and not separating from her husband even to visit her
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family unless her husband expressly consents and authorizes this parting. Maintenance is
also determined by the man in accordance with his abilities. He emphasizes that the ‘illah
behind qiwwāmah is not that men have been chosen by God to be prophets or imams, and
that even if God has chosen women to occupy the position of imam or caliph, they would
still have to be subject to the husband’s qiwwāmah because of their fitrah. ‘Abduh makes
it clear that prophet hood cannot be determined by making a judgment that men are better
than women, nor for ‘Abduh is the fact that men occupy these positions a valid
assumption of God’s preference to men over women. He interprets the God has created
man “with more powerful, impeccable, and appealing temperaments” and it’s because of
these preferences that they are more capable of qiwwāmah.192
He reiterates that the expression “bima faddal Allah ba’aduhum ‘ala ba‘ad” refers to men
over women. He acknowledges that this meaning could have been more obvious
(zāhir)193 if the verse said “bima faddallahum ‘ala ba‘adihinna,” but he assures that there
is a rationale (hikmah) behind this subtlety. The expression “ba‘aduhum ‘ala ba’ad” is as
‘Abduh reads it a statement from God indicating that men are from women, and women
from men. They’re both parts of the body of one person; the husband should not
arbitrarily exercise qiwwāmah over his wife, and she in turn should not feel hampered by
what he exceeds in and deem it undermining to her worth and importance. The
preferential designation by God that begets this hierarchical relationship he reasons is in
the interest of the whole society. Another hikmah of this subtlety he argues in the
expression “ba’aduhum ‘ala ba’ad” is that God has bestowed this preferential
temperaments on to the male sex but not on all male individuals over female individuals
as many women exceed men in their knowledge, and ability to make a living .194
In examining his understanding of qiwwāmah, it is clear that ‘Abduh has read the verse as
confining the social role of qiwwāmah to one sex, the male sex, even though he expressly
acknowledges through the previous statement that in reality not all men necessarily put
their powerful, impeccable, and appealing temperaments into optimal use for the benefit
192
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of society and that women who have less powerful temperaments can and do exceed men
many times. To him men being more rational does not imply that women are irrational.
He even goes far as to say that even though women exceed men as with regards to their
biological ability to bear children and give birth, men are not likely to wish for that which
God has preferentially designated women. Women though are more likely to wish for
what men exceed them in be it reason (‘aql), religion, strength because what men have is
something common in both sexes. ‘Abduh does not assume that women cannot rule or be
in authority. He has a methodical understanding of where qiwwāmah flows from, but does
not address the consequences of not putting these already present preferences in males
into use. He discusses and maintains the ideal, what he deems to be constituents of the
truly interdependent and mutual relationship between man and woman in the verse but
does not propose how we can implement this empirical referent. Agreeing that the
temperaments in which men are preferred are already present in women as well, how
would the relationship look like if say the man was more religious but the woman more
influential? As we can see here, ‘Abduh unlike the traditional jurists engages in a lengthy
discussion over what qiwwāmah means. He does not at all use the terminology of women
being prisoners in their husbands’ home or the ruler/subject understanding here in
rationalizing this hierarchical relationship. This however is not reflected in his discussion
on Q. 2:221 on the prohibition of interfaith marriages between Muslim women and Kitābī
men.195 Initially, ‘Abduh clearly states that Kitābiyyāt are permissible for Muslim men
but that the Qur’anic text is silent on the marriage of a Kitābī man with a Muslim
woman.196 He is satisfied with the general opinion that the rule preventing marriage of
Muslim women with Kitābī men is based on the original prohibition of Muslims marrying
idol worshippers in Q. 2:221 and derives its legitimacy from the Sunna and consensus of
the jurists.197 In the commentary, the possibility of an alternative reading of the situation
is mentioned: “it might be said that original assumption entails permissibility (al asl ‘ala
al ’ibāha) and that the text was only revealed to prohibit marriage with idol worshippers
in order to emphasize the offense of associating others with God.”198 This opinion which
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‘Abduh also maintains provides that Kitābiyyāt are permissible for Muslim men in
marriage as Muslims unite in faith with Ahl al-kitāb. The proponents of this opinion
emphasize that the marriage of a Muslim man with a woman from Ahl al-kitāb allows the
latter sect to “observe our good mannerism and the ease of our religion.”199 Thus,
“because the man is designated with wilāyah and authority over woman [sahib al wilāyah
wa al-sulta ‘ala al mar’ah], his good treatment of his wife becomes evidence that his
religion calls to the right and the straight path, and justice between Muslims and nonMuslims, and the great capacity in them of dealing with those who are different.”200 On
the other hand, this purpose or reason is not visible in the marriage of a Muslim woman to
a Kitābī man “because the woman is a prisoner [’asīrah] to the man especially in sects in
which women are not privileged with rights similar to those granted to them by Islam.”201
In his Qur’anic commentary, Fi Zilāl al-Qur’an, Sayyid Qutb starts off with a brief
introduction regarding the influence and importance of religion on the deep and enduring
bond of marriage. Qutb writes that “a clear and common objective must exist between
both parties, and what is better than religious faith to provide such affinity and unity of
purpose.”202 He first makes a case as to why interfaith marriages were allowed in Mecca
between Muslims and idol worshippers before the divine prohibition since Muslims at the
time were only able to separate themselves spiritually but not socially from the
community and so the transformation needed to be gradual until they gained an
independent social and political identity in Medinah. At that point in time any new
marriages between Muslims and idol worshippers were prohibited. Up to the sixth Islamic
century, already existing marriages continued to be valid till verses Q. 60:9 and Q. 60:10
were revealed annulling the existing interfaith marriages between Muslims and idol
worshippers indefinitely. He argues that God has prohibited these marriages as they
“devoid of spiritual meaning” and are only based on physical attraction.203 Qutb writes
that in case conversion to Islam takes place “the barrier would be removed and the hearts
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of the two people concerned would fall into harmony and could be united in marriage as
they are united in belief… It is the attraction of the soul that really matters.”204 Qutb then
moves on to discuss Q. 5:5 permitting a Muslim man to marry a Kitābiyyah. He supports
the distinction between a Kitābiyyah who believes in God’s oneness and a Kitābiyyah
who believes in Trinity or that Jesus is the Lord (in the case of Christians), or that Ezra is
the son of God (in the case of Jews). Nevertheless, he acknowledges that the majority of
‘ulama’ did not consider the latter category of Kitābiyyāt unlawful to Muslim men. Qutb
then comes to reason why Muslim women are unlawful to Kitābī men. He begins his
argument by mentioning that children take their father’s name in accordance with
Sharī‘ah and then he relies on customary practice to rationalize the prohibition stating
that in “all societies” a woman following marriage joins the household of her husband
“[thus] in the case of a Muslim woman marrying a Jewish or a Christian man […] the
children would be raised in a non-Muslim culture and most likely grow up to be nonMuslims.”205 Interestingly he also mentions that there are “practical considerations” that
make it wise to discourage interfaith marriages between Muslim me and Kitābiyyāt
despite its permissibility. He cites a tradition mentioned in tafsīr Ibn Kathīr by ‘umar ibn
el Khattāb who was not in favor these unions as according to him it can cause Muslim
men to turn away from marrying Muslim women.206 Qutb bases his opinion on evidence
provided by “recent experience” that “such marriages undermine the faith and Muslim
identity of the new generations of Islam, especially in view of the fact that our societies
today are only nominally Muslim.”207

Displaying fragments of thought from the early classical modernists in his work, Al-halal
wa al-Haram fi al-Islam, al-Qaradawī dismisses the ambiguities surrounding certain
matters in Shari’a, drawing what is lawful and what is prohibited. He does this by
providing an explanation and reference to the Qur’an and Sunna. Al-Qaradawī makes
clear in his argument that an interfaith union can only be based on a husband’s respect for
his wife’s beliefs, and that if this is not the case then a healthy relationship can never
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develop. This explanation is based on an understanding of marriage and respect between
spouses from the husband’s perspective solely. It is evident that the discourse here is
based on patriarchal ethos since it refutes marriage of a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim
man based on her husband’s likely disrespect of her belief. In accordance with alQaradawī’s argument, the authority of the man as “master of the house,” provides an
opportunity for him to oppose his wife’s religious practice and this authority can only be
restricted by the existence of a religious rule that stipulates otherwise as in the case of
Muslim men having to respect their non-Muslim partners who are people of the book.208
Al-Qaradawī also assumes that Islam is consistent in itself since a Muslim man is
expressly prohibited to marry an idolatress woman on the grounds that his religion
obliges him to acknowledge the existence of the three heavenly religions only, and hence
it would be impossible for both of them to live together. However, this interpretation
necessarily enforces a certain view of how non-Muslims would perceive respect for their
partner’s beliefs. This interpretation thus, assumes universal applicability even to nonMuslims, that respect of a husband/wife for their partner’s autonomous choice of his/her
religious practice is necessarily tied to the husband/wife’s acknowledgement of their
partner’s religion.
‘Abd al-Mit‘āl al-Jabrī, who was a student of Hassan al-Bannā, argued instead that
Q.60:10 can not possibly be abrogated by Q. 5:5 even if it were revealed after it, simply
because in accordance with the usulīs’ methods of interpretation, a ruling that is
supplemented by further proof and confirming evidence cannot be abrogated.209 He
asserts that the whole Qur’anic chapter of Surat al-Mumtahanah provides confirming
evidence that affection should not be shown towards non-Muslims and that marriage
requires such affection. Al-Jabrī thus reads the ruling in Q. 60:10 in consideration of the
whole Surah. He asserts that only kindness and just treatment towards Muslims is
required of Muslims towards non-Muslims who don’t threaten them in accordance with
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Q. 60:8, but that showing affection or befriending them can compromise a Muslim’s faith
and practice. 210
Heba Ezzat, an Islamist figure and women’s rights activist, writes that human succession
(Istikhlāf) encompasses both men and women, and that in Arabic language – the language
of the Qur’an- the term insān for human and bashar for mankind are used to refer to both
men and women.211 Regarding succession for both men and women, she cites the
following verses:
“And their Lord has accepted of them, and answered them: "Never will I suffer to be
lost the work of any of you, be he male or female: you are members, one of another:”212
“Whoever works righteousness, man or woman, and has Faith, verily, to him We will
give a new Life, a life that is good and pure, and We will bestow on such their reward
according to the best of their actions.”213
“O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you
into nations and tribes, that you may know each other (not that you may despise each
other). Verily the most honored of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most
righteous of you. And Allah has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all
things).”214

She points out that this succession comprises a main tenet of man and woman’s tawhīd
(doctrine of monotheism in Islam which holds that God is one and single) in light of them
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(men and women who are believers) “[…being] protectors of one another.”215 They are
both equal in terms of human value, social rights, responsibility, and punishment.
In her work, Ezzat emphasizes that as it was put by the Zahiri faqīh ‘Ibn Hazm, legal
rules governing inheritance in Sharī’ah and the exemption of women from the economic
burdens of the household are only exceptions to the original rule (al-asl) of equality
between the sexes.216 Equality between men and women in Sharī’a is absolute in some of
its aspects, and relative and particular in those which conform to some of the different
characteristics between both sexes, serving thus their complementary roles in achieving
succession. Ezzat cites ‘Ibn Hazm’s statement that since the Messenger of Allah peace be
upon him – was sent to men and women alike, and that the words of God and his Prophet
to men and women are one, it is not permissible to allot any of it to men without women,
unless there is a clear text or consensus, since particularization of what is apparent and
obvious (Zāhir) is not permissible.217 This shows a) that there was an awareness among
the circles of jurists that the general rule invoked by Sharia’s equality between all b) that
any exceptions made to this rule unless sanctioned by God, or reached by the consensus
of all the jurists in one era, are arbitrary since God is neutral and since the Prophet
(PBUH) said “My ’ummah will never agree upon an error.”218

Ezzat writes that qiwwāmah has been cited three times in the Qur’an, and not just in the
verse Q. 4:34 of the Qur’an, to which most writers confine the term and examine it
separately:
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“O ye who believe! Stand out firmly for justice [kunu qāwamīn bil qisti], as witnesses to
Allah”219
“O ye who believe! Stand out firmly for Allah [kunu qāwamīn lil Allah, shuhadā’ bil
qist], as witnesses to fair dealing”220
Qiwwāmah in these two verses is shown to be a general characteristic of both men and
women; both are protectors of Islam (kāwamun ‘ala amr al dīn) and witnesses.
Qiwwāmah is associated with justice and tawhīd both at the general level of ‘Ummah and
at the household level where man is given the responsibility over the household affairs.
This responsibility entails justice in running those affairs that have been entrusted to him
by God, which to Ezzat is antithetical to the concept of authority as the latter could be
misunderstood as absolute freedom to act; understanding qiwwāmah as male authority to
Ezzat negates the notion of the verse.221
Ezzat writes that the word “qawwam” involves two important elements: 1) the man takes
it upon himself to provide spiritual and material needs of the woman, so as to ensure
proper satisfaction of her wishes as well as her own tranquility and serenity 2) the man
offers the woman protection and care and manages the family’s affairs justly. She also
provides that the qiwwāmah, which she at this point of her work starts to refer to as
“authority” rather than responsibility, is subject to restrictions that give way to the
capability and eligibility of women and children to act within the strictures of what is
deemed legitimate and permissible in Islam. Of these restrictions Ezzat mentions that the
only authority that the head of the household has over his sons and daughters who attain
majority (hit the age of puberty) is guidance. She specifically states that the man has no
specific authority with regards to granting his major daughters permission to marry.
Major sons and daughters Ezzat asserts have full personal rights, whether in economic or
social life dealing or in choosing their career or spouse.
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With regards to the ‘illah of qiwwāmah, Ezzat mentions that many scholars have
attempted to unravel the ratio legis behind Islamic legislation of qiwwāmah. According to
Ezzat, some of the mufassirūn identified the ‘illah to be a material and economic one
since “the man is the one who maintains the family [haythu ’anna al rajul huwa’ al ‘a’ilū
li ’al ’usrah].”The second ‘illah which is preference, Ezzat argues, should be understood
in light of the distinction between “characteristics of manliness and femininity.” She
asserts that the term darajah mentioned in another verse discussed earlier is not
associated with maleness but rather with manliness which can be defined as certain
mannerisms and characteristics present in a man in light of which the man is given the
trusteeship of qiwwāmah.222

B. Contemporary Interpretive Strategies:
The first part of this section constitutes a vital component of this thesis; it tells the story
of the progressive feminist and egalitarian Qur’anic interpretation that stand in contrast
with the methods of traditional religious mufassirūn. It then presents the interpretive
tools that shape the fragmented yet interrelated body of work of early and late progressive
Muslim thinkers, who share a common genealogy in their mining of modernist
interpretations from the Qur’an.
In the 1920s, in a context where women’s role and social status was being reevaluated,
and while the modernist wave allowed for a degree of skepticism of traditional Islamic
authorities which had full control over Islamic knowledge, Qur’an-based Islamic
feminism emerged.223 Feminist tafsīr can be defined as a contemporary strand of
Qur’anic tafsīr which unlike pre-modern tafsīr works, explicates the Qur’an not by
proceeding systematically through the entirety of the text.224 Instead in their work they
select verses according to their applicability to the themes of interest of the interpreter
who reads the selected verse in conjunction with another to shed light on the Qur’an’s
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broader treatment of the chosen themes.225 These feminists claimed their authority to
engage with and interpret the Qur’an and Sunna; and to critically examine tafsīr and fiqh
literature and hadith compilations. By doing so, they attempted to elucidate that the
Islamic tradition is neither singular nor immutable. Their aim was to problematize
patriarchal religious knowledge and “to produce new knowledge that makes the case for
gender equality and justice from within an Islamic paradigm.”226 Their successors
emerged in the late twentieth century as the Islamic revivalist movements developed
across the Muslim world.
This section presents three interpretive tools: a) the historical contextualization method,
b) the intratextual method, and c) the tawhīdic paradigm. The Historical contextualization
method of interpretation of the Qur’an entails the usage of the historical context in which
the verse was revealed to provide further insight on the interpretation of the verse.227 The
historical contextualization method relates to the narrative tool used in tafsīr literature:
occasion of the revelation (’asbāb al-nuzūl). This tool can be defined as “reports,
transmitted generally from the Companions of Muhammad, detailing the cause, time, and
place of the revelation of a portion of the Qur’an.”228 The occasion of revelation thus
“acts in a historical-theological way, acting as the guarantor of the veracity of God’s
revelation to man and His concern for His creation.”229 ’Asbāb al-nuzūl act as “an
authoritative interpretational context” and an indication for mufassirūn of which portions
of a verse are solely attached to the historical event and which despite the occasion of
revelation have broader insinuations.230 Nevertheless, authoritative mufassirūn are found
to be reluctant in putting too much weight on this tool in reading and interpreting
Qur’anic verses. This is due to their “fear that doing so might suggest that the revelations
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were determined by historical circumstances, that is, that the ’asbāb al-nuzūl might be
construed as ‘occasions for (not of)’ revelation.”231

In addition, the historical contextualization method also entails that the mufassirūn
differentiate between descriptive and prescriptive verses (i.e. verses that describe norms
that were common in the first Islamic century and those that prescribe a certain conduct to
the readers).232 Nevertheless, there exists a controversy regarding the use of this method
as traditional mufassirūn saw that the usage of a historical situation to understand a verse,
undermines its universal usage through time and space and thus resorted to having a
limited use of it.233 This is because “any implication that a verse’s application is somehow
limited only to the specific situation or persons identified (…) is generally regarded (…)
as dangerous and unacceptable,” by traditional mufassirūn.234

Nevertheless, feminist mufassirūn argue otherwise that disregarding or undermining the
historical context leads in fact to a distorted understanding. This distorted understanding
comes from “universalizing particulars” that is placing the weight of universality on a
particular situation from which a universal principle should be deduced.235 Feminist
mufassirūn thus claim that similarly much of the Qur’anic verses have become
universalized particulars from which the real universal intent has been undermined in
favor of the particular universalized understanding.236

There has been a lengthy discussion over the relationship between history and the Qur’an.
Asma Barlas argues that egalitarianism is part and parcel of the epistemology and ethics
of the Qur’an, advocates reading the Qur’an as a historically situated text. Conservative
and traditionist Islam hold that God’s word is eternal and that God has spoken in a
concrete historical situation where the Prophet Muhammad was merely a passive
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recipient of God’s word revealed to him. Traditionists in Baraba Stowasser’s words “deny
that the [the Prophet] participated in shaping content or even form- including language
and style—of God’s message” and in doing so she argues that they in fact “deny that God
spoke in a concrete historical situation.”[1] The problematic relationship between
“immanence and transcendence” is demarcated by the latter “which eliminates the value
[…] the possibility of historical critical methods of scripturalist interpretations.”

Second, the intratextual method emphasizes an understanding and interpretation of the
verses that takes into consideration the whole body of the Qur’an. That is to interpret the
Qur’an using the Qur’an or tafsīr al-Qur’an bi-l-Qur’an237. This is even emphasized by
verses in the Qur’an itself such as: “We believe In the Book; the whole of it is from our
Lord” and “Those who break the Qur’an into parts. Them, by thy Lord, We shall
question, every one, of what they used to do.”238 While there is consensus regarding the
use of this method, the practical implementation of it is mostly “inconsistent,
unsystematic and haphazard.”239 That is to say, that a systematic model does not exist for
the intratextual and holistic interpretation of the Qur’an text. Wadud comments
particularly on the lacking of a methodology that brings together and contrasts similar and
differing ideas, themes, principles and linguistic structures within the Qur’an.240 With this
conceptualization of intratextual interpretation, the feminist mufassirūn argue that many
of the patriarchal readings of verses such as the qiwwāmah verse are in fact inspired by
unitary readings focusing on certain words or phrases and undermining the holistic
reading of the subject matter.241
Finally the Tawhīdic paradigm’s main principles entail that no one has the final word
regarding the interpretation of the Qur’an. This method emphasizes the unity, uniqueness
and indivisibility of God and thus considers the any form of differentiation between races,
sexes or otherwise to be a form of shirk or idolatry.242 This is so since such a form of
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differentiation implies a perception or judgment of superiority made by one human
against the other which is a judgment that is exclusive to God.243 Thus using the same
logic , feminist mufassirūn claimed that readings of verses such as the qiwwāmah verse
that perpetuate concepts of female obedience to men create idols out of men by creating a
spiritual hierarchy in which women have to show obedience to men in order to be
obedient to God.244 Thereby, they condemn such a reading as being idolatrous.

Having defined the interpretive strategies that have mostly shaped contemporary
progressive interpretations of select verses from the Qur’an, the next section moves on to
illustrate how these interpretations result in different conceptualizations of the nature and
role of woman in the Islamic institution of marriage as well as the textual sources’
position towards the religious other and their status within a Muslim community.

1. Their Application:
By looking in the previous chapter of this thesis at the concept of qiwwāmah in Q. 4:34
and fiqh discourse on transacting and maintaining marriage, I argued that a normalization
of the status and nature of woman has been established in the Islamic tradition. In light of
this normalization, IFM verses have been read and regulations were laid. The second
factor determinant to how IFM have been regulated in Islamic legal discourse, is how the
religious other (in this case the People of the Book) is made sense of in the Islamic
tradition. A critical reexamination of these conceptualizations can alter how the verses
governing IFM between Muslims and Ahl al-kitāb are understood. In carrying out this
critical reexamination, I survey some of the contemporary works of scholars who
question these conceptualizations established in the tradition by directly engaging with
the Qur’anic text.
’Amīnah Wadud, a professor of Islamic studies with a progressive focus on Qur’an’s
tafsīr, contextualizes Q. 4:34 in her book Qur’an and Woman, a classic work of feminist
Qur’anic interpretation. Wadud states that “the verse is describing a specific socio243
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economic situation in which a husband is the financial provider for his wife and child but
only under specific conditions.”245 The first of these conditions is that he must be
preferred by God and she restricts this to the situation in which men receive a greater
share of inheritance than women, this occurs “when the share of male is twice that of a
female within a single family.”246 Second, the husband must be financially capable of
supporting his family from his income. She indicates that the nuanced section of the verse
“some are preferred over others” is further hint of the specifity and particularity of the
verse.247

In her contextualization of the verse, Wadud also aspires for a more broadened reading of
qiwwāmah as communal responsibility so as to fit the changing historical context of
family relationships. She elaborates on Qutb’s understanding of qiwwāmah which she
says is purely material, and suggests that attention be given to “the spiritual, moral,
intellectual, and psychological dimensions as well […] Such an attitude will overcome
the competitive and hierarchical thinking which destroys rather than nurtures.”248

Wadud also employs the intratextual method in her attempt to read the part of the verse
sanctioning hitting (fa ’idribuhunna) as a form of disciplining the wife. She argues that
the word idribuhanna has various definitions and usages yet one of these usages is to
indicate striking a person. Nevertheless, Wadud still puts forward that Qur’anic passage
cannot justify violence against women in marriage as the goal of a husband striking his
wife in the verse was harmony not harm and that the text in line with the Qur’an’s
position on equity and kindness should be read as restricting violence. This is particularly
evident for Wadud in that early jurists also pronounced limitations and restrictions on the
act of striking one’s wife. Although Wadud engages extensively with tafsīr of Qur’anic
verses, yet her interpretations are not informed by considerations “relating to Sunna or

AMINA WADUD, QUR’AN AND WOMAN 71 (Oxford University Press 1999).
Id.
247
Id.
248
Id. at 74.
245
246

67

Islamic legal theory […] it offers a partial understanding of how normative Muslim
woman’s constructs are formulated.”249
’Asmā’ Barlas offers alternative interpretation of Q. 4:34. Unlike Wadud, Barlas engages
in a critique of the association between the patriarchy manifested in the interpretations of
tafsīr works and the Qur’an which was perceived as a patriarchal text. This association
between both was a result of the prevailing Muslim historical context and was “central in
determining and defining religious epistemology and methodology, thus also how
Muslims came to read the Qur’an.”250 Barlas states that making the interpretation of the
Qur’anic text dependent on the Sunna which was afterwards merged into the canonical
hadith literature resulted in removing the text’s hermeneutical privilege. This is because it
reduced the scope of what might be deemed an authentic or an authoritative reading of the
Qur’anic text and its epistemological and methodological techniques and sources.251 Both
Barlas and ‘Azīzah al-Hibrī utilize the intratextual method pointing to verses such as Q.
9:71 which designate both men and women to be each other’s protector.252 This verse to
both constitutes textual evidence that undermines any interpretation of qiwwāmah in Q.
4:34 as male intellectual and moral superiority and authority over women.253 Al-Hibrī
reads qiwwāmah in Q. 4:34 as “affirmative action to protect women. The revelation about
maintenance provided women against poverty” in a given contextual situation where
women were dominated by men.254 She asserts that in such a situation “God gave the man
supporting a woman the responsibility of offering the woman guidance and advice in
those areas in which he happens to be more qualified or experienced.”255
In her re-examination of the concept of qiwwāmah, Asma Lamrabet, a Moroccan Islamic
feminist, provides an egalitarian reading of qiwwāmah and simultaneously criticizes how
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the perception of qiwwāmah and tā’ah in the tradition “facilitated the proliferation of a
whole religious literature that devalues women and has hindered the liberating spirit of
the Qur’anic message regarding women and their status in the marriage and family.”256
Lamrabet uses the intratextual method to understand qiwwāmah where she reads 4:34 in
light of “the emancipatory message” of the Qur’an emphasizing that the Qur’an has
encouraged believers to free slaves in accordance with Q. 2:177, 90:30, and 9:60,
especially female slaves.257 Nevertheless she claims that the interpretations of
authoritative mufassirūn to be a result of a developing social context. Lamrabet states
that258 “not long after the Prophet’s death, during the Islamic conquests, the taking of
jariyat (female slaves) became the sign of a ruler’s wealth [...] with jariyat cloistered in
the palaces and political consultation (shura) replaced by autocracy.”259 Lamrabet argues
that because of these social pressures qiwwāmah “was construed according to the reading
of hakimiya (political governance), since the husband’s authority was explicitly linked to
that of the Hakim (head of state).”260
In her examination of the verses governing IFM, Asma Lamrabet states that some
commentators attempted to justify the prohibition by providing Q. 60:10, the context
revelation and meaning of which she asserts is not “associated with the case of marriage
to non-Muslims.”261 Lamrabet argues that as the explanation of the verse demonstrates, its
purpose is to “prevent the extradition of women who converted to Islam and avoid the
vengeance of their respective families… to meet some strategic requirements of
protecting women who converted to Islam against the will of their family and who
voluntarily asked for the Prophet’s protection.”262
Lamrabet also highlights an important contradiction in tafsīr literature. She puts forth that
the proponents of the position that Q. 2:221 excludes Ahl al-kitāb from the mushrikīn and
mushrikāt that Muslims are not permitted to marry, are the same people who claim that a
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Muslim woman cannot marry a Jewish or a Christian man because they are
disbelievers.263 Since the Qur’anic order given in Q. 2:221 quite clearly addresses both
Muslim men and women equally, it becomes essential to rethink how regulations
governing IFM for both came to be built and perceived differently in fiqh discourse.
Lamrabet rethinks the prohibition of a marriage between Muslims and mushriks in Q.
2:221. She thoroughly examines the context of the revelation of this verse stating that its
“order made sense” as the mushrikīn whom she refers to as polytheists were “an
aristocratic class of obscene wealth and indecent conduct.”264 There were thus two aims
of this regulation according to Lamrabet: 1) Q. 2:221 urged Muslim men and women to
choose the “modest believing slaves over the rich arrogant polytheists” to encourage
Muslims to value people on basis other than their social class, thus, establishing a balance
between the differences established by the ethnic-tribal system at that time 2) The
Qur’anic verse urges Muslim men and women to get married to believers who had, like
them, such faith awareness and were conscious of justice on earth. 265
Nasr Hāmid Abū Zayd also presents what he sees as a logical contradiction between time
and place specifity of ’asbāb al-nuzūl which has been acknowledged in traditional Islamic
discourse while traditional scholars also were simultaneously determined to preserve the
text’s word for word eternal nature.266 He uses the historical contextualization method in
his book to read Q. 4:34 stating that qiwwāmah is not a legislative verse but rather a
descriptive one of a reality in seventh century Arabia that Islam aspired to gradually
change to achieve justice.267 Abū Zayd asserts that the Qur’anic text revealed took into
consideration the setting and circumstances of those addressed. He cites al-Suyūtī’s
narratives of the occasion in which Q. 4:34 was revealed, stating that in one narrative, the
Prophet condemned the man who hit his wife, and in another narrative, demanded
retaliation for the woman who was hit.268 Abū Zayd considers these condemnations by the
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Prophet as clear textual implications (dalālāt wādihah) whose purpose is “to emphasize
the original principle of equality in Islam.”269 Qiwwāmah to Abū Zayd was a regulatory
tool governing the authority and preference given to men over women according to the
then existing conventional societal rules.; qiwwāmah represented an incremental and a
progressive step towards an equality that was not yet to be tolerated by those to whom the
Qur’anic text was revealed.270 Feminist tafsīr also alludes to the creation story in the
Qur’an as evidence for human equality irrespective of sex. All verses thus that govern
male-female relations should thus be read in light of the creation story.

In his work, Farid Esack, a South African Muslim theologian, argues that terms kufr,
shirk, ’imān and Ahl al-kitāb are dynamic terms that “are embodied in certain qualities of
individuals in different stages of their lives.”271 These terms can have a number of
meanings and connotations which can be doctrinal, philosophical, spiritual, ideological,
and that are intertwined and which can change over time. These concepts are “inherently
linked to issues of righteous deeds […] they can exist at an abstract and reified levels.”272
Esack argues that the association of these reified concepts with a particular socioreligious and historical community resulted in the narrowing of boundaries of belief in
Islamic theology.273 The abstract concept of ’imān was substituted with Islam for selfidentification. Donner argues that the narrowing of the confessional identity of ’imān
resulted in the refuting to grant the status of believer to anyone outside the Prophet’s
socio-religious and historic community.274 Esack perceives ’imān as “a personal
recognition of and an active response to the presence of God in the universe and in
history,” and identifies the dynamism inherent in the concept on many levels which
ranges from dilute to perfect ’imān.275 Similarly when speaking of the concepts of
kufr/shirk, Esack argues that the early mufassirūn failed in making a distinction between
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kufr “as an active attitude of individuals and the socio-religious ethnic identity of the
group.”276
Esack reads the Qur’anic texts that deal with the concept of wilāyah with regards to the
Muslim and the religious other, as an ideological-political issue rather than a doctrinal
one. Esack asserts that when these texts are understood in their historical contexts offer a
radically different perspective to that which a casual and decontextualized reading
render.”277 On Ahl al-kitāb, Esack writes that “to employ the Qur’anic category of the
people of the Book in a generalized manner of simplistic identification of all Jews and
Christians in contemporary society is to avoid the historical realities of Medinian society,
as well as the theological diversity among the both earlier and contemporary Christians
and Jews.”278 He makes a clear statement that nowhere “in the disciplines of exegesis,
Islamic history or legal scholarship have the Muslims known anything approximating
consensus about the identity of the People of the Book.”279 In fact, based on the
theological predilections of Muslim scholars and often the geo-political context in which
these scholars lived, Hindus, Sabeans, Zoroastrians, Buddhists, and Magians were at
various times either included or excluded from the category of the People of the Book.280
In contrast to Esack’s broader understanding of ’imān, Shahrūr argues that the concept of
’imān is in fact less general than that of ’islām(which literally means submission); he
defines the former as those who possess the quality of Islam which is belief in God and
the last day and doing what is righteous.281 Shahrūr defines the latter as those who have a
specific religious belief as well as particularistic ethics based on this belief which can be
traced back to the Prophet Muhammad.” 282 Based on this he also constructs a
classification of the concept of kufr: a kufr in the realm of ’imān and a kufr in the realm of
’islām. The latter rejects the minimal requirements of ’islām mentioned above while the
276
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latter dismisses the Prophethood of Muhammad and the Qur’an as being of divine
origin.283
Sa‘d Al-Dīn Al-Hilālī, head of the Comparative Islamic Jurisprudence department in AlAzhar University, has voiced an opinion describing Christians and Jews as Muslims.284
He cites Ibn Taymiyyah who says that Islam can be classified into two categories, one
being general, encompassing Muslims and all other followers of monotheistic religions,
and the other particular, pertaining only to Muslims. Al-Hilālī cites scriptural evidence for
his claim namely Q. 22:78:
And strive in His cause as you ought to strive, (with sincerity and under discipline). He
has chosen you, and has imposed no difficulties on you in religion; it is the cult of your
father Abraham. It is He Who has named you Muslims, both before and in this
(Revelation); that the Messenger may be a witness for you, and you be witnesses for
mankind! So establish regular Prayer, give regular Charity, and hold fast to Allah! He is
your Protector - the Best to protect and the Best to help!285

Al-Hilālī interprets from this verse that any of the three monotheistic religions is
considered Islam. To support this Al-Hilālī also cites Q. 3:19: “The Religion before Allah
is Islam (submission to His Will): nor did the People of the Book dissent therefrom
except through envy of each other, after knowledge had come to them. But if any deny
the Signs of Allah, Allah is swift in calling to account.”286 Al-Hilālī also claims this
opinion to be one that is old having been mentioned in past traditional jurisprudential
works. He particularly mentions ’Ibn Al-Salah who said, “All past monotheistic ’Ummahs
should be regarded Muslim since Allah described all prophets as Muslims”, he thus
argues that it doesn’t make sense that their followers won’t be considered equally
Muslims. To this Muhammad Al-Ghazalī, an Islamic cleric and scholar who was a
prominent advocate of moderate Islamic revivalism, writes that those who are considered
Mu’minun are those who followed Jesus and Moses without changing their words, who he
asserts would have followed Prophet Muhammad themselves had they been alive.287 AlGhazalī thus refers to a narrower group from amongst Christians and Jews as mu’minun
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with “no difference between them and those believers who came later [Muslims] in
worshipping God, good manner, and reward.”288 He cites in support of his position Q.
5:44 and Q. 2:62. Yet he asserts in another section of his book that an interfaith marriage
of Muslim woman to a Kitābī man is impermissible because of Qiwwāmah.

Ahmed Subhy Mansour, an Islamic scholar who rejects the science of hadith altogether
and believes that the Qur’an is the sole source of Sharī’a, offers yet another
understanding and interpretation of interfaith marriage and the implied loyalty and
adherence (walā’ and muwālāh) between both parties created through contractual
marriage and the creation of familial ties and relationships. In his work, Mansour
criticizes the Wahhabi understanding of muwālāh/ adherence and loyalty at the times of
War claiming that contrary to their understanding of it the idea of declaring walā’/
loyalty and barā’/ enmity in Islam289 is dependent mostly on the person’s actions rather
than on their creed and persona in particular. That is to say that enmity towards a
particular person goes back to his disagreeable action rather than his belief in a certain
system.290 Furthermore he continues by saying that the degree of enmity is also dependent
on the degree of disagreeableness of that person’s actions.
Once Mansour establishes that muwālāh with a mushrik, Kitābī and Kāfir is possible, he
addresses the issue of interfaith marriage between Muslims and Scriptural people
generally stating that the claim that the allowance of marriage made in verse Q. 5:5 is
only inclusive of earlier Christians and Jews who came before the revelation is incorrect.
His argument against such statements being that the Qur’an should not be limited in time
if such a limitation is not to be gleaned out of the text itself. Furthermore, Mansour states
that the examination of verse Q. 5:5 shows that as the food of Ahl al- kitāb was allowed
for Muslims and the food of Muslims allowed for Ahl al-kitāb so it follows that the
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marriage of women from both sides is also allowed according to Mansour’s reading of the
verse.291

2. Critique:
Feminist tafsīr has been criticized for treating “gender equality as a norm established by
the Qur’an, to the point of becoming a blinding dogma.”292 Not only that, but these
interpreters staunchly believe in the true egalitarian nature of the Qur’an. It is essential
that feminist mufassirūn take interpretive responsibility by critically investigating what
they demand of the text. This is becoming increasingly urgent, as feminist mufassirūn
have continuously been critiqued for their abandonment of the principles of Qur’anic
tafsīr, lacking adab (proper manner) with regards to the revered tradition of tafsīr, and
that their readings and understandings of concepts in the Qur’an are merely based on
personal inclinations.293
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IV. Conclusion:
The authoritative works in fiqh and tafsīr literature discussed in this thesis incessantly
reaffirm the consensus of the ‘ulamā’ that an interfaith marriage between a Muslim
woman and a Kitābī man is prohibited. As evidenced in the scholars’ work, there is
variance in their reading of the available textual sources to produce the prohibition. They
also reason with other forms of evidence to support their position. Consequently, the
consensus cannot be said to have been based on definite textual evidence but rather on a
normative understanding of the textual sources at hand. In looking at how the consensus
was built and how the three verses governing IFM regulations were linked in tafsīr and
fiqh sources, it is clear that the basis on which this rule has become an essential element
of Sharī‘ah is far from being uniform.

This lack of uniformity is due to three reasons. First is the different ways the prohibition
has been deduced from the Qur’anic evidence. Some have simply arrived at the
conclusion that Q. 2:221 addressed both Scriptuaries and polytheists and that Q. 5:5 made
an exception to Muslim men with regards to Scriptural women. Others who read Q. 2:221
as solely addressing polytheists, asserted its applicability to Scriptuaries given the
common ratio legis behind impermissibility of such a marriage to Muslims. In light of Q.
5:5, the common ratio legis (‘illah) detected in Q. 2:221: “Unbelievers do (but) beckon
you to the Fire,” was seen by proponents of this position as applicable only to Muslim
women. In other discussions, Q. 60:10 came to mark an end of impermissibility of
interfaith marriages between Muslims and unbelievers be they polytheists or Scriptuaries

The second reason as to why the basis of the consensus on such a prohibition is not
constant between scholars, is the monotonous but inconsistent use of traditions to support
and legitimize the deductions made, some of whose chains of transmission (’Isnād) are
weak. The choice of the traditions used thus not only depends on its ’Isnād but also on the
madhab according to which the faqīh is affiliated.

Third, the positions deduced from and supported by textual sources to crystallize the
prohibition, are in themselves, based on normative conceptualizations of the nature and
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status of the woman in the marriage institution and of the religious other. This thesis
argues that behind this prohibition lies the hierarchical perception of the woman, both in
society and as a member of family which is articulated as the man’s qiwwāmah over her.
The wife thus becomes analogous in her position to a slave whose master cannot be of a
differing religion to maintain Islam’s religious and political superiority. Qiwwāmah thus
becomes key in the discussion on the prohibition of interfaith marriages between Muslim
women and Scriptural men because of its governing role in the Islamic perception of the
marital relationship. This thesis argues against such a perception by presenting multiple
understandings of qiwwāmah that can culminate in the production of a contemporary
‘Islamic’ discourse on interfaith marriage regulations. This thesis also examines the
variance in the tafsīr and fiqh literature with regards to perception of the religious other
(mushrik, kāfir, Kitābī) which is another determinant factor of how interfaith marriages
are regulated in Islamic legal discourse.
In presenting the nuanced discussions of these concepts in tafsīr and fiqh literature as well
as these concepts’ contemporary understandings, this thesis makes the case for a rearticulation of interfaith marriage regulations in Islamic legal discourse that is more
inclusive and contextualized.
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